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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation maintains that organizational efficiency and interest competition are 
the two pnmary forces of institutional fomiation for the public good provision. On the one 
hand, efficient institutions are in principle desirable, since they bring about potential gains for 
the involved interests as a whole. On the other, interest conflict In distributing the potential 
gains may lead to the emergence of some altematives that appear relatively inefficient. The 
perceived institutional inefficiency, however, comes from neglecting the fact that settling 
distribution disputes is frequently costly in the human society. 
In this dissertation, a comprehensive organizational classification is proposed in 
terms of ownership an'angement. This classification is comprehensive in the sense that all 
institutions can be categorized in a theoretically thorough framewori<. It facilitates the 
comparison of organizational efficiencies and Identification of the beneficiary and harmed 
under main institutional altematives. Analysis In the relative advantages/disadvantages of 
Institutions under different situations leads to the conclusion of several general principles for 
the institutional patterns of the public good provision. 
When use exclusion is relatively easy, difficulties In market transacting or ownership 
exercising affect the determination of organizational arrangements, which aim at mitigating 
the associated difficulties. That is, total costs associated with transacting and ownership 
decide whether the public good provision would be done through producer-owned fimris, 
customer cooperatives, member-controlled organizations (including govemments), 
producer-owned firms under govemment regulations, or nonprofits. On the other hand, non-
excludability problem may be solved by tie-in transactions or by Indirect transaction via a 
third party. Such contractual arrangements do not require direct governmental Involvement. 
Non-excludability may also be resolved by establishing formal/infomnal rules for use 
vii 
exclusion and/or income right to the provided service. Establishment of such property right 
institutions always involves customer ownership of some forms. Therefore, difficulties/costs 
associated with collective decision-making by diverse interests serve as the key detenminant 
to the final outcome of public good provision. 
Finally, the empirical study focus on three types of dams: navigation, wildlife 
conservation, and flood control. Based on the theory proposed in this dissertation, some 
hypotheses for the ownership patterns of dams are derived and tested for the evaluation of 
my theoretical underpinnings. Empirical evidences are found strongly supportive. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since Samuelson (1954) raised the concems about the efficiency problem in 
providing public goods, studies on the general prindple for the provision of public goods 
have been rapidly growing. Comes and Sandler (1996) have made the major contribution to 
the survey of the literature in this field. On the other hand, controversies and debates seem 
inevitable as usual. Cowen (1988) and Foldvary (1994), notably, have been devoted to the 
collection of those challenging arguments. Disputes commonly center on whether 
"govemment intervention" is generally desirable for the provision of public goods. 
The famous Samuelson condition stimulated some considerations, which has led to 
the caution of the "nirvana" fallacy, that any social planner also faces constraints. The 
concept of "constrained Pareto optimum" has started to take its place. To evaluate the 
perfonnances of organizational and institutional altematives, a researcher needs to identify 
and include the relevant underiying constraints, which confine the benefit-maximizing actors 
to a limited range of choices. In other words, it is inappropriate to contrast reality with 
ideality against any organizational arrangement. 
Inspired by Coase (1937,1960), so-called "new institutional economists" have 
consistently argued that effidency comparison among altematives be one key to understand 
the organizational and institutional arrangements.^  In principle, institutional efficiency is 
desirable, since it brings about potential gain for the involved interests as a whole. On the 
other hand, distribution of the resulting gain may involve intense competition among different 
interests, which has also been recognized as the primary factor of institutional fonmation and 
 ^ Cheung (1992) provided a readable discussion on the new institutional economics. For more 
detailed literature review, see Eggertsson (1990), and Furubotn and Richter (1997). 
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change, as shown in works by North (1981,1990), Olson (1982), Libecap (1989), and many 
others. In their view, interest conflict in distributing the potential gains may lead to the 
emergence of some altematives that appear relatively inefficient. The perceived institutional 
inefficiency, however, comes from implicitly assuming that settling distribution disputes is 
costless. As we know, reality does not support this assumption. Nonetheless, both 
efflciency comparison and interest competition will be maintained in this dissertation as the 
two keys to the analysis of institutional fomnation and change. 
One fundamental question remains - how can we exhaust all possible organizational 
and institutional forms for comparing their efficiencies and net benefit distributions? 
Recently, Hansmann (1996) has made the path-breaking contribution to the generalization 
of organizational patterns in terms of ownership structure. In my view, Hansmann's work 
significantly facilitates investigation on the organizational choice of public good provision. 
With some extension, all institutional and organizational altematives can be classified within 
a unified analytical framewori<. Within this comprehensive framework, the organizational 
efficiencies of major institutional altematives can be placed into comparison. The 
beneficiary and the harmed groups can also be identified. Investigating the potential gain 
from organizational efficiency and interest competition for its distribution will help predict the 
emergence of institutional and organizational arrangements. 
The purposes of this dissertation are as follows. First, I shall argue and demonstrate 
how economic analysis can benefit from placing the properties of the public good into a 
choice-theoretic frameworit. Within this framework, we can explain and predict whether and 
what kind of public goods will be provided, both of which are the integral parts of the 
problem of public good provision. Inquiries based on this viewpoint are very limited in 
number. 
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Secondly, this dissertation will extend Hansmann's organizational classification to a 
comprehensive one so that all institutions and organizations can be included. I shall argue 
that, based on the concepts of property rights and transaction costs, this extended 
perspective allows us to investigate all organizational an^angements of production and 
exchange in a systematic and thorough fashion. That is, this perspective transcends the 
previous controversies, resulting arguably from the ambiguous distinction between "market-
based" and "governmental intervention." 
Next, this dissertation will attempt to derive the general principles of organizational 
choice of public good provision. Based on various kinds of possible difficulties in the 
process of production and exchange, the advantages and viability of different organizational 
arrangements will be hypothesized and summarized. 
Finally, an empirical study will be conducted in the ownership pattems of the dams 
primary for navigation, flood control, and fish-wildlife conservation. Some theoretical 
conclusions in my analysis will be formulated into ten testable hypotheses. These ten 
hypotheses will then be evaluated against the empirical evidences. As we shall see in 
chapter 6, those theoretical conclusions are strongly supported by the empirical evidences. 
The organization of this dissertation is as follows. In chapter 2, a critical literature 
review is presented. Discussion on non-rivalry and its social construction (endogeneity) is 
then given in chapter 3. A theoretical foundation of organizational choice is elaborated in 
chapter 4. A simple formal model then follows. In chapter 6, an empirical study is 
presented. Finally, conclusion and limitation of this research will be discussed. 
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2. CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
While the large literature of common pool resources evidently reveals the exclusive 
rules and their enforcement as the objects of choice, little attention has been paid to the 
social construction of non-rivalry characteristic. The latter is nonetheless the integral part of 
the public-good problem. 
Specialization and division of labor are commonly known as the primary source of 
productivity increase. To realize the tremendous benefits, resources owned by different 
individuals have to be organized for the purposes of production and exchange. This 
practice inevitably generates the needs of delineating, exercising, and protecting individual 
property rights to the collective resources and benefits. These activities incur costs, which 
are commonly termed transaction costs in economics. Hence, to study human 
organizational choice, including that for public good provision, property rights and 
transaction costs serve as two gemnane concepts. 
The literature of industrial organizations in general paid little attention to the problem 
of collective decision-making by the involved interests within an organization. In contrast, 
the literature of public choice and common pool resources has forcefully revealed its 
importance in determining the success of any collective action. When an organization is 
collectively owned by a group of individuals, the issues of collective decision-making is 
unavoidable. 
This leads us to go on discussing the problem of competition among interest groups. 
To investigate interest competition, it is fundamental to identify the major actors and their 
distinctive positions regarding institutional anrangements. Moreover, the competitive 
advantages/disadvantages of different interests vary under different circumstances. It is 
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important to examine under what conditions certain class of interest(s) will become more 
influential and successful. 
Hence, this review is planned to cover the following topics: (1) socially constructed 
non-rivalry, (2) non-excludability and excludability, (3) property rights and transaction costs, 
(4) costs of collective decision-making, (4) organizations from the perspective of ownership 
structure by Hansmann (1996), and (5) competition among different interests. 
2.1. Socially Constructed Non-Rivalry 
The debate among Malkin and Wildavsky (1991), and Comes and Sandler (1994a) 
has raised the interesting issue on the "endogeneity" of public good properties. In other 
words, the public-good properties do not necessarily result from inherent physical nature or 
technological constraint; they can also originate from people's choice. Take a group trip for 
example. If group members agree to rent a tour bus together instead of driving their own 
vehicles, the public nature of transportation is then created. As another example, a group of 
students may decide that each specializes in individual parts of an assignment so as to save 
time and raise quality. The resulting gain from the teamwork carries the feature of non-
rivalry, generated from students' choice. To study the problem of public good provision, we 
should investigate first why people initially choose to create the incentive stmcture of public 
goods when they can do otherwise. 
2.2. Non-Excludability and Excludability 
In the worid of resource scarcity, exclusion of others from own resources is a 
significant part of human competitive behaviors. In a society without established rules and 
orders, human beings can exclude others from the resources they hold by violence: force 
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guarantees excludability of a resource. On the other hand, in a society with established 
rules and orders, excludability of a resource is decided and secured by agreed-upon rules 
backed up by social sanctions, so that dissipation resulting from exclusion by individual 
violence can be avoided. 
The study of Umbeck (1981) on California gold rush revealed the possibility of 
establishing rules and orders through private contracting. Moreover, many works on the 
problem of common pool resources, such as Libecap (1989), Ostrom (1990), and others, 
also focused on whether and how the involved interests acted collectively to establish the 
exclusive rights, via member-owned organizations, mediation, court njlings. or legislation. In 
some cases, legislation for securing the income right of service providers is sufficient. The 
study of Pool (1980) on fire control subscription business provided a good illustration. 
Patents and copyrights are also conspicuous examples. 
Given the possibility of exclusion, the literature of excludable public goods has been 
developed, owing to Thompson (1968), Oakland (1974,1987) among others.^  It has raised 
the concerns about the efficiency problem in the cases of monopolists with or without 
information for necessary price discrimination. These considerations are important 
especially when limited market demands cause slim profit margins so that for-profit firms 
cannot survive without being able to conduct (near) perfect price discrimination. The 
analysis may apply to such businesses as museums, libraries, high-culture performing arts, 
higher education, and academic researches. 
The development of club good theories since Buchanan (1965), Tiebout (1958), and 
Olson (1965), is among the most remari<able.^  Recent extension on the issues of 
transaction costs (e.g.. Helsley and Strange (1991)), combined with asymmetric information 
 ^ For more reference, see Comes and Sandler (1996, p. 248). 
 ^ See Sandler and Tschirhart (1980,1997), and Comes and Sandler (1996) for the detailed survey of 
club theories. 
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(e.g., Lee (1991)), raised the concern as to the role those factors play in the institutional 
selection. As Comes and Sandler (1996) point out, it is now commonly concluded among 
club good theorists that preferable institutional choices depend on such factors as 
monopoly, transaction costs, asymmetric information, and so on. Further research is 
necessary on institutional pattems and their detemiination. 
2.3. Concepts of Property Rights and Transaction Costs 
2.3.1. Property rights and private property 
Scarcity of resources makes competition inevitable. The conflict of competition must 
be resolved in some manner. Arman A. Alchian proposed that the establishment of property 
rights is to replace competition by destructive violence with competition by peaceful or 
orderiy means; therefore, the mles that restrain competition for resources are known as 
property rights.'* Conceivably if resources were always more than sufficient so that there 
was no need for competition, property right an-angement would be of no purpose. 
Periiaps Cheung (1970,1974) is the first economist who explicitly defined private 
property rights, which is now commonly accepted.^  Three distinctive sets of rights are 
identified and associated with idealized private ownership. The first is the rights to use or 
decide how to use the resource, which may also be viewed as rights to exclude non-owners. 
The second is the rights to appropriate the stream of rents from use of and investments in 
the resource. The third is the rights to sell or otherwise transfer the resource to others. 
In reality, private property is a matter of degree. Attenuation of a private property 
can result from relaxed exclusive rights to use, to receive income, to transfer, or any of their 
 ^ See Alchian (1987,1993,1995), and Alchian and Allen (1964). 
 ^ See, for example, Alchian (1993, p. 69), Oe Alessi (1980, p. 4), Hansmann (1996, p. 11), and 
Libecap (1989, p. 1). 
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combination. Different situations may lead to different outcomes of corresponding 
contractual behavior, resource allocation, and income distribution. In order to investigate 
those issues, it is important to distinguish different sets of rights and examine the 
relationship among them. 
Moreover, the absence or attenuation of exclusive rights may be attributed to 
prohibitively high costs of delineating and policing their limits. Similariy, the transfer of rights 
in the maritet is not only constrained by institutions but also by the costs of negotiating and 
enforcing contracts. In drawing inferences on changes in rights, for example, it is important 
not only to investigate whether there are observable institutional changes, but also whether 
there are changes in the costs of transacting. In economics literature, these costs are called 
"transaction costs." 
2.3.2. Transaction costs 
As most economists agree that the transaction costs include those of searching, 
negotiating and enforcing contracts, and so on, there seems to be no agreement on its 
definition. Two main views have arisen among economists. 
The first defines transaction costs as "the costs of using the price mechanism" 
(Coase (1937)); that is, all costs assodated with mari<et transacting. In Coase's own 
analogy, they would be those costs that did not exist in a completely communist society, 
where a central governmental authority directed the use and allocation of all resources 
(Coase (1992, p. 73)). Examples include costs of discovering the prices, negotiating and 
closing a contract, enforcing a contract, and so on. Note that, in this view, transaction costs 
do not include agency costs, and costs of collective dedsion-making among owners within 
an enterprise, all of which are at times termed "govemance costs." 
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This paper follows the second viewpoint, the broadest sense of "transaction costs" 
proposed by Cheung (1978) as "all those costs that cannot be conceived to exist in a 
Robinson Crusoe (one-man) economy." The term then includes not only the costs of 
contracting and negotiating, but also those of measuring and policing property rights, of 
engaging in politics for power, of monitoring performances, and of organizing activities. In 
other words, they are the costs of coordinating the activities of different people in the 
economic system. As Cheung often adds, a better phrase will be "institutional costs". 
According to Cheung (1978), one important reason for the broader definition is that, 
as in the case of joint products, different types of transaction costs are often separable only 
at the margin. Sometimes it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the cost of governance 
from the cost of exchange. For example, a manager hired to monitor other employees may 
also help to negotiate a contract. 
However, in this dissertation I shall further argue that many inputs may contribute to 
the process of both production and exchange; hence, production costs and various sorts of 
transactions costs frequently cannot be separated. For example, a foreman may not only be 
involved directly in the production, but also monitor workers and provide the management 
with valuable information on woricers' needs. Therefore, knowing the existence of 
transaction costs is more important than individually measuring themP Nonetheless, 
testable propositions will still be feasible if we are able to at least rank the total costs of both 
production and exchange under different circumstances. 
It is always helpful if we make the concept of transaction costs as concrete as 
possible. For example, to estimate the sum of agency costs in general, this dissertation 
° Wallis and North (1986) attempted to directly measure transaction costs in the American economy 
over 100 years. However, the problem of inseparable costs of production and transaction was 
argued by some critics to be overwhelming against the robustness of their estimation. See Davis 
(1986). 
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proposes the following diagram. Figure 2.1 depicts an example of the cost elements 
constituting the "agency costs." The degree of effective monitoring is on the horizontal axis, 
and the cost level on the vertical axis. Note that the degree of monitoring is expressed in 
the percentage temns for the demonstrative purpose. Curve A represents the expected cost 
resulting from the agent's opportunistic behaviors, including shiri<ing, self-dealing, and so 
on. As the degree of effective monitoring increases, this portion of cost is expected to 
decrease, and eventually become zero under the perfect monitoring. On the other hand, 
resources need to be devoted into raising the effectiveness of monitoring, the cost of which 
is illustrated by the curve B. Higher degree of monitoring generally results in higher level of 
cost, as shown by the upward sloping of curve B. 
Under the postulate of cost minimization, the principle chooses the degree of 
monitoring that minimizes the total of expected loss from the agent's opportunism and 
monitoring cost. The level of the "agency costs", hence, is proposed here as the minimized 
sum of both cost elements. Consider the case that the agents are close family members so 
that the cost of the agents' opportunism is expected to be relatively low at each monitoring 
level, represented by a lower curve A than othenwise. The cost-minimizing level of 
monitoring will become lower since it is now less necessary to prevent the agents' 
opportunistic behaviors. As another example, suppose the cost of monitoring is largely 
reduced owing to the improved monitoring technique, represented by a lower curve B than 
othenwise. The optimal monitoring level will become higher since monitoring is now more 
worthwhile. In either example, the smaller total of the agency costs will result, despite of the 
changed degree of monitoring. 
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Cost 
A + B 
100% 0 
Effectiveness of IMonitoring (m) 
A: Cost of the agent's opportunism 
B: Cost of monitoring 
m*: Optimal degree of monitoring 
C*; The level of total agency costs 
Figure 2.1. Elements of agency cost 
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2.4. Costs of Collective Decision-Making 
In this dissertation, the difficulties of collective decision-making by diverse interests 
will be placed into spedal emphasis. Owing to the literature of public choice, extensively 
surveyed by Mueller (1989), economists have better understood some of voting behaviors 
and associated problems. Median voter theorem maintains that under certain conditions the 
median voter is in the decisive position of voting outcome if majority rule is adopted. If the 
median voter is significantly different from the average representative of population, then the 
voting outcome may be undesirable (Bergstrom (1979)). These have led to the concerns 
about undesirable voting outcome due to insignificant majority. 
On the other hand, well-organized minority might be able to control the voting 
outcome in favor of their interests. As formally analyzed in the paper of Denzau and Munger 
(1986), an organized minority may be able to affect the voting outcome by paying campaign 
contributions to some legislators who represent the unorganized voters with less conflicting 
interests or with infonnational disadvantages. In other words, there can be some cases in 
which unrepresentative but influential minority detemnines the voting outcome. 
Although vote trading through coalition is one possible solution for the above 
problems, voting trading is also subjected to cost consideration. Moreover, voting trading is 
not free from another well-known difficulty, voting cycle. Voting cycle can cause such 
problems as unstable decision-making, and agenda control by influential individual or group. 
However, institutional arrangements such as procedural restrictions on voting, and 
delegation in the committee system, may mitigate the problem of voting cycles, as 
maintained in the literature on structure-induced equilibrium (Shepsle (1979), Shepsle and 
Weingast (1987)). Research efforts have since been devoted to investigating the 
emergence of such political institutions. Commonly accepted theory does not exist so far. 
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Among the notable developments, recently surveyed by Shepsle and Welngast (1994), 
Weingast and Marshall (1988) for instance analyzed the fomiation of political organizations, 
applying the organizational theory of new institutional economics. Since the institutional and 
organizational choice of public good provision often involves legislation and other 
govemmental regulations, some knowledge in the operation of political institutions is 
necessary. 
To make more concrete the concept of costs of collective decision-making, in this 
dissertation, the costs of collective decision-making are represented in the following 
diagram. Figure 2.2 illustrates the cost elements constituting the cost of collective decision­
making. For demonstration, the choice of decision njles is simplified as the choice of 
majority rules. Following Buchanan and Tullock (1962), the horizontal axis measures the 
percentage of voters required for making a collective decision, as the vertical axis shows the 
cost level. Curve A depicts the expected cost resulting from sacrificing those losing 
opposed in voting, given a certain decision rule. The cost of this kind is expected to 
decrease as the required percentage of agreeing voters increases. When the unanimity aile 
is adopted, the expected cost of sacrificing the opposing interests becomes zero. On the 
other hand, the higher the percentage of required votes for decision-making, the more costly 
it would generally take to fomn a decisive coalition, since more interests need to be 
addressed in exchange for their votes. This recognition is reflected in the upward-slopping 
curve B, the cost of forming a decisive coalition. 
Given the postulate of cost minimization, the involved as a whole choose the 
percentage of votes required for decision-making, which minimizes the tofa/of expected 
sacrifice of the opposing interests and cost of vote exchange. Hence, the cost level of 
collective decision-making is proposed as the sum of both cost elements. 
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Cost 
A + B 
0 N n 
Number of Voters (n) 
A; Cost of sacrificing the opposed 
B: Cost of fonning winning coalition 
n*; Optimal majority rule 
N; Number of total voters 
C*; Cost of collective decision-making 
Figure 2.2. Cost of collective decision-making 
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2.5. Ownership Structure of Enterprise by IHansmann 
For the purpose of production and exchange, resource owners are connected by a 
set of contracts within an organization/ On the supply side, there are owners of various 
factors of production, including investors of capital, managers, workers, and providers of 
other goods or services as inputs. On the demand side, customers pay prices in exchange 
for goods or services. These people are called "patrons" of an enterprise in the term of 
Hansmann (1996). There are in general two forms of connection between an organization 
and patrons. One is in the form of ownership, to which the organization is assigned. The 
other is in the form of market contracts between the organization and patrons, such as loan 
contracts, employment contracts, contracts of sale, and so on. 
It is not difficult to see that different classes of patrons may have different cost 
advantages or disadvantages in (1) exercising their property rights associated with the 
collective ownership if they are the owners, and in (2) market contracting if not. For 
example, a class of patrons could be so diverse in tenms of their interests, so dispersed in 
location, or so transient as patrons, that the costs related to collective decision making, 
monitoring employees, and so on, are prohibitively high. On the other hand, some class of 
patrons could suffer from enonnously costly activities of mari<et contracting, due to the price 
exploitation by the monopoly, the "lock-in" problem resulting from transaction specificity, or 
serious informational disadvantages. If less costly relations with an organization are chosen 
for all patrons, then higher organizational efficiency in tenms of cost saving will result. This is 
the central idea in the ownership anrangement based on the postulate of transaction costs 
minimization. 
 ^ See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for the view of "a firm as a nexus of contract." 
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2.5.1. Classification of organizations 
In Hansmann's view, the traditional business corporation is arranged In the way that 
the ownership of enterprise is assigned to the Investors of capital. When the ownership is 
assigned to managers and other workers, such an organizational fonn as partnership and 
worker cooperatives emerge. Some organizations such as farmer-owned producer 
cooperatives, dominating the markets for basic agricultural commodities, are conspicuous 
examples of the ownership assigned to the suppliers of raw materials as inputs. These are 
all classified as producer ownership of different fomris in this dissertation. 
On the other hand, when customers are an'anged as the owners, there occur such 
organizations as consumer retail cooperatives, wholesale and supply cooperatives, 
associative associations, member-owned clubs, condominium and housing cooperatives. 
These are among the fomris of customer ownership. 
Another possibility is that the ownership is assigned to no one. Such an organization 
is called "nonprofit" by Hansmann (1996). Accordingly, a nonprofit organization may be 
managed by some people but no one owns a share of the organization as fee simple. 
Managers or board of directors/trustees are hired to run the business on a fiduciary basis. 
Profits or net earnings, if any, will be retained within the organization exclusively for 
financing the organization-related activities. 
Note that Hansmann's definition of nonprofit is different from those of some other law 
scholars. In many states of the United States, related laws at present regard as nonprofit 
such organizations as housing cooperatives and condominium, member-owned clubs, trade 
associations, and so on (Oleck (1980, chapter 2)). Most of these are placed into the 
category of customer ownership instead in Hansmann's classification. 
In my view, the disagreement probably results from the subtlety that the (stream of) 
benefits/rents generated from an asset take either the pecuniary or non-pecuniary fomi. 
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When the main purpose of a member-owned organization is to provide services for its 
members instead of profit generating, the organization may be financed by merely 
assessing member fees for necessary expenditures. No pecuniary eamings will be 
generated from providing services in this case. The organization is literally "not-for-profit." 
Naturally It leads to the impression and terminology of "nonprofit". Nonetheless, this 
dissertation does not intend to take part in the definitional dispute, which must involve 
subjective preference or values. Despite the definition for a "nonprofit" organization, 
disagreement shall disappear when we focus on the ownership an-angement. 
In addition, when a certain class of patrons suffers fi-om prohibitive costs of market 
contracting, such a class of patrons may then be the most appropriate owners even if they 
cannot effectively exercise their property rights. Since this sort of ownership attenuation is a 
matter of degree, the distinction between nominal ownership and absence of patron 
ownership will become blurred at the margin. Examples are many, including such 
organizations as publicly traded corporations, mutual insurance companies, mutual banking 
institutions, and so on. In those cases, while organizations are nominally owned by either 
their investors, customers or members, they are operated by a group of managers largely 
free of owner interference. 
Extended from Hansmann's organizational classification, this dissertation maintains 
that the government can be regarded as a form of nominal customer ownership. Taxpayers, 
as the owners of a state, are essentially the customers of governmental services. While 
they can elect their representatives to control the govemment, such control is in many cases 
ineffective, rendering certain degree of administrative autonomy. Various fomis of 
bureaucratic inefficiency and conruption present the very essence of agency costs. As 
mentioned above, the more attenuated the collective taxpayer ownership, the more blun'ed 
the distinction between the collective ownership and its absence. Besides, when budget 
18 
surplus occurs. It is usually retained within the government, similar to the "non-distribution 
constraint", to which nonprofit organizations are subject. Therefore, the government is 
similar in many ways to the form of nonprofit organizations, and may be called a member-
controlled nonprofit organization. 
For some times a few economists such as Coase and North have viewed the 
government within the framework of fimi organization. More specifically, the govemment 
takes the form of nominal customer/member ownership. With this general viewpoint, all 
sorts of organizations can be placed into single unified framework of analysis, as we shall 
see more clearly later in chapter 4. 
2.6. Competition among Interest Groups 
Although institutional efficiency gains are presumably beneficial to the involved 
interests as a whole, distribution of the resulting benefits may be such a difficult undertaking 
that the institution with the highest perceived efficiency would not be reached. From one 
perspective, this merely reflects that distribution of benefits among diverse interests can be 
prohibitively costly. Logically, under the postulate of constrained maximization, if a scheme 
of compensatory side payment could be easily devised and enforced from the beneficiary to 
the hamned, the highest institutional efficiency would always be achieved. 
In economic literature, studies on regulations have attempted to provide theories and 
their empirical evidences for the fomnation of regulatory institutions. Specific in the area of 
regulations, these theories carry broad implications that apply to the formation of institutional 
arrangements in general. Among the noted are "public interest theory," capture theory." and 
"economic theory of regulation." Competition among different interests for favorable 
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institutional arrangements has gradually become the central theme, in accord with that of 
the public choice literature. 
Public interest theory, also called "normative analysis as a positive theory" since 
Joskow and Noll (1981), claimed that regulation should and would occur in industries 
plagued with market failures, such as natural monopoly, externality, and imperfect 
information. Moreover, this theory was later refined to argue that regulation could be 
mismanaged by the regulatory agency. On the other hand, the capture theory, long existing 
in the literature of political science,° maintained that either the legislature provides regulation 
In response to the industry's need, or the regulatory agency comes to be controlled by the 
industry over time. In addition to their empirical counter evidences, these two "theories" 
have been criticized as stated hypotheses with little theoretical underpinnings. 
Equipped with the main thesis of Olson (1965), Chicago scholars Stigler (1971), 
Posner (1974), Pelzman (1976), and Becker (1983), have collectively established so-called 
"economic theory of regulation" (ET). According to ET, different interest groups compete for 
favorable regulation, and regulation tends to be beneficial to relatively small groups with 
strong preferences over regulation at the cost of relatively large groups with weak 
preferences. Also, ET argues that regulation is most likely in relatively competitive or 
relative monopolistic industries, since In these industries regulation will have the bigger 
impact on some interest' well-being. Recognized as an important theoretical development, 
ET has nevertheless been under severe criticism. 
One important criticism is that ET grossly ignores how the legislative and regulatory 
institutions operate in practice. That Is, it assumes unrealistically that interest groups 
adequately control legislators and regulatory agendes passively respond to the legislation. 
' See for example, Hem'ng (1936), Huntington (1952), Bernstein (1955), Edelman (1964), and Lowi 
(1969). 
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Moreover, the claimed advantages of well-organized small groups over unorganized 
populous interests have been forcefully challenged. 
To elaborate, first of all, industry interest fails frequently to present a united front. 
That is, the regulated industry often consists of different interests and hence different 
standpoints for regulation. For example, antitrust laws on mergers, price discrimination, and 
vertical restrictions such as exclusive dealing are generally supported by small businesses, 
while opposed by large enterprises. In the case of food safety regulation, a single position is 
rarely possible for such competing interests as National Meat Council, Iowa Beef Packers, 
Wilson's, and Swift. It is also observed that large firms are less likely to oppose such 
regulation than are small ones. In short, carefully identifying different interests within an 
industry is inevitable for the analysis of interest competition. 
As revealed by Denzau and Munger (1986), unorganized interests such as 
consumers or citizens may still be well represented in the political process owing to their 
voting power. It is because politicians, in order to secure reelection, have to take into 
account the preferences of unorganized but populous voters. Well-organized small interest 
groups can only be more likely to succeed in obtaining the support of politicians 
representing constituents with less conflicting interests, or with informational disadvantages. 
As the unorganized interests have great at stake, the involved issues will usually be highly 
salient. Dominance of well-organized small interests is far from easy when the issues are 
high in public salience. 
Despite the notable hypothesis of bureaucratic budget-maximizing behaviors by 
Niskanen (1971), ET has simply assumed non-elected bureaucratic officials as (more or 
less) passive respondents to the desires of politicians. ET's assumption later found 
justification in the studies of Weingast and Moran (1983), McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 
(1987,1989), who argued that bureaucrats might be effectively constrained by the 
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legislators through budget appropriations, monitoring of oversight committees, and tight 
administrative rules. 
However, this view has raised strong disagreement, especially from the scholars of 
public administration.^  It is commonly shared among political scientists that, as regulatory 
activities gradually involves high degree of technical complexity, professionalism has 
established in many areas such as environmental, health and safety regulations. These 
professional bureaucrats are at times able to pursuit their own goals, following principles of 
scientific management, and discipline solidarity. Environmental Protection Agency against 
Ann Burford as the agency head in the Reagan administration may be the most famous 
example. 
As emphasized by Johnson and Libecap (1994), bureaucracy should not be treated 
as single unitary entity as in the literature,^ " if we hope for advancing our knowledge about 
the bureaucratic behaviors. Their study identifies bureaucrats as three classes: political 
appointees, senior career officials, and rank-and-file career employees. Each class has 
distinctive constraints and incentives. First of all, the Interests of political appointees are 
more aligned with those of their appointing politicians (e.g., elected chief executives). On 
the other hand, their interests may considerably differ from those of other politicians (e.g., 
legislators) representing distinctive constituents. 
In contrast, senior career offidals and rank-and-file career employees are frequently 
protected by job tenure and standardized payment plan, and thus owe no specific allegiance 
to the administrative or legislative politicians. Moreover, different policy positions among 
chief executives and legislators often render opportunities for bureaucratic discretion, 
especially when the control right to the bureaucracy is not well defined. 
 ^ See, for example, Meier (1985,1988), Moe (1993), and Wilson (1980,1989). 
See, for example, Tuilock (1965), Niskanen (1971), Weingastand Moran (1983), McCubbins, Noll, 
and Weingast (1987,1989), Moe (1989). 
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As part of bureaucratic management, senior career officials have management 
directives to subordinates. With infomnation advantage of agency operation, career 
bureaucrats are sometimes able to fonn strategic alliances with the administrative or 
legislative politicians in order to pursue own interests. The rise of bureaucratic 
professionalism may not only result in strong professional beliefs or preferences, but also 
job performance Incentive through peer pressure and outside employment opportunities. 
For the issues involving high degree of technical complexity, the professional bureaucrats 
might be able to shape information and guide opinions. In short, career bureaucrats are not 
simply passive enforcers of policies made by politicians, as ET assumed. 
Therefore, key actors in the institutional fomriation may include business groups, 
consumers/citizens, politicians, bureaucrats, and others,^  ^depending on different situations. 
In general, the competitive advantages of different actors depend on their motivations, and 
capabilities or resources. Interests need enough motivation for taking actions, since 
involvement is often costly. However, even if strongly motivated, an actor may fail to exert 
meaningful influence due to lack of adequate capabilities or resources. 
Gomnley (1986) has proposed public salience and technical complexity as two 
important dimensions forjudging which set of actors will be most likely to be influential in the 
competition for favorable institutions. By his definition, "a highly salient issue is one that 
affects a large number of people in a significant way. A highly complex issue is one that 
raises factual questions that cannot be answered by generalists or laypersons." (Gormley 
(1986, p. 598)) Examples of high public salience and low technical complexity include such 
issues as abortion, gun control, zoning regulation, and so on. Examples of high public 
salience and high technical complexity include such issues as occupational health and 
Others include judges, professional individuals or groups, journalists, and so on. 
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safety, new drug licensing, hazardous waste regulation, and so on. Examples of low public 
salience and low technical complexity include such issues as building inspections, 
restaurant inspections, election regulation, and so on. Finally, examples of low public 
salience but high technical complexity include occupational licensing, insurance regulation, 
securities regulation, and so on. 
Consumer/citizen groups always play a part in the issues of high salience, since they 
have great pecuniary or non-pecuniary interests at stake. However, when the issues are 
also highly complex, their Involvement becomes less effective. Similarly, politicians are 
always attracted to highly salient issues, due to high rewards from such investment. 
However, when the issues are also highly complex, their involvement often becomes less 
substantive or merely symbolic. 
Business Interests are the regular participants whether the issues are high in public 
salience or not. However, highly salient issues must involve Intense competition with other 
Interests, and thus making it difficult for business interests to secure institutional 
arangements (entirely) in their favor. On the other hand, issues of high complexity make 
business interests more effective due to their professional expertise. Therefore, the testable 
hypothesis can be proposed that business interests is most likely to dominate in the 
institutional competition when the issues are low in public salience and high In complexity. 
Bureaucrats are another class of regular participants since they are in charge of 
institutional enforcement. Given the above analysis, it shall be clear now that professional 
bureaucratic officials frequently become influential when the issues are highly salient and 
complex so that citizens and politicians find effective involvement difficult, while business 
interests find it difficult to manipulate for self Interests without raising any objection. 
Technical complexity requires expertise to address, and high public salience eliminates the 
chance for domination by business interests. 
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Finally, the role of lower-level bureaucrats should not be ignored when the issues are 
neither salient nor complex. Through routine operations and discretion of detailed 
application, rank-and-file career bureaucrats may be able to cause "policy drift" by misusing 
their authority in inspections, fines, and the like. 
In conclusion, competition among diverse interests is a complex phenomenon. It is 
fundamental to make careful distinction among key actors. It is also important to investigate 
the advantages/disadvantages of different actors under different situations. Small and well-
organized interests do not necessarily lead to dominance in competition. Since most 
institutional arrangements are determined in the political process and enforced by the 
bureaucracy, some detailed knowledge about the governmental operations is essential in 
the study of institutional fomnation or changes. In other words, analysis cannot further 
advance without unveiling every obscure facet of the government. 
Based on the literature discussed in this chapter, the investigation in the 
organizational choice of public good provision proceeds as follows. First, some elaboration 
on the definition and identification of non-rivalry characteristic precedes the investigation of 
its social construction. Next, theoretical analysis on the institutional and organizational 
choice is presented in the following section. Many public good cases such as public utilities, 
infrastructures, and so on, will be discussed in the process of deriving general organizational 
principles for public good provision. 
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3. NON-RIVALRY AND ITS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
3.1. Definitional Discussion 
Samuelson (1954, p. 387) proposed the concept of collective consumption, later 
called non-rivalry, as the characteristic such that "each individual's consumption of such a 
good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good." This 
brief wording on the concept may need some careful interpretation. The first consideration 
is about its time element. 
In Samuelson's timeless model, as long as consumers agree to share a rivalrous 
good such as a pen or chair by sequential uses, this shared rivalrous good then features 
non-rivalry of Samuelson's public good, due to the same unit of shared good entering into 
every individual's utility function. Such a rivalrous but sequentially usable good presumably 
should be ruled out from Samuelson's concept of non-rivalry. Therefore, it may be a good 
idea to rephrase the concept with the emphasis on time element. Here non-rivalry is worded 
as the characteristic such that one person's consumption of a unit of the good does not at all 
detract the consumption opportunities still available to others simultaneously from the same 
unit. A good example can be a flood-control dam enjoyed by all residents in the nearby 
valley. 
Another consideration is about the relevant unit to the consumption good in question. 
In many cases, there are more than one way of refem'ng to the relevant unit of the 
consumed object, hence rendering it difficult to distinguish cleariy non-rivalry from rivalry 
feature. For example, a highway as a traveled space is essentially rivalrous since any 
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occupied spot cannot be simultaneously occupied by any other vehicle or object.^  ^ When 
the traffic is low, the needed occupancy penod of every spot on a highway by a car is so 
short that every spot become immediately available to other cars. While a highway could 
turn from a road into a big parking lot sometimes, the nature of spatial rivalry never changes. 
However, if we refer an entire highway as the relevant unit of consumption, then It is almost 
impossible for Denver's mass traffic jam on interstate 80 to block any car in Des Moines in 
the same way at the same time. When the entire highway Is considered, non-rivalry feature 
appears, though not to its full degree. 
In addition, consumption activities can be so complex that refem'ng the relevant unit 
in question is only part of the difficulties in identifying whether they are non-rivalrous or not. 
In many cases, a consumption good, which may be composed of a set of goods and 
services, delivers consumption benefits of more than one kinds, some of which are rivalrous, 
while others not. This point has long been recognized and emphasized in the literature of 
joint-product models,^  ^based on the characteristic approach, attributable to those worits by 
Lancaster (e.g. 1971), Gorman (1980), among others. For example, the Yellowstone 
National Park may deliver recreational, commercial, educational, and environmental 
benefits, which may or may not be rivalrous. Here it is no longer simple to identify whether a 
consumption good/service presents non-rivalry feature or otherwise. 
3.2. Social Construction of Non-Rivairy 
Partly in response to Malkin and Wildavsky (1991), Comes and Sandler (1994a) 
clarified some misinterpretations and misuses of the concept of public good, while 
More precisely, the nature of spatial rivalry connes from the fact that any substance with three-
dimensional periodic atomic arrangement has mass and occupies space. 
See, for example. Sandmo (1973), Sandler (1977,1992), Comes and Sandler (1984,1994b). 
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maintaining the importance of studying these properties of the public good for evaluating 
resource allocations under different incentive stmctures. Their discussion also raised the 
interesting issue about endogeneity of the public good's properties. This section seeks to 
further address this topic. 
We shall begin the discussion by asking the following question: why do people 
choose to create the public good shared among them when they can choose otherwise? 
Take again a group trip for example. The group members can choose either to drive their 
own vehicles, or to share a rental tour bus together. Under the consideration of various 
kinds of costs and benefits, if the choice of renting a tour bus results in higher net benefits, 
then the public good may be chosen by the group for the purpose of transportation. When a 
shared good/service such as car pooling is chosen, the property of (partial) non-rivalry, or a 
(congestible) public good, is then created. In addition, the degree of non-rivalry or 
congestibility depends on both the number of users and the chosen quantity or capacity of 
the shared good. In this sense, the non-rivalry or congestibility is said to be the result of 
choice, not inherent physical nature. 
3.2.1. The possibility and benefit of cooperation 
Although the inherent non-rivalry characteristic, if any, of a good implies the sharing 
possibility, but non-rivalry is not the necessary condition for sharing. A durable or renewable 
good with the potential of repeated uses can be shared among the public as long as both 
the following two circumstances prevail. (1) Each individual use has to last for a relatively 
short period of time, or regeneration makes the same kind of good continually available. (2) 
The maintenance of the good does not interrupt the consumption activities in a significant 
way, or consumption behaviors can be regulated by a set of rules without much affecting the 
consumption activities. Absence of any of the two will render significant difficulty in sharing. 
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Goods with the above two features can thus be chosen for the public use so that huge 
amount of resources will be released for other purposes, leading to more economical uses 
of scarce resources. Therefore, the possibility and benefit of sharing provide the motivation 
of creating the public nature of the shared good, regardless of its inherent physical nature of 
rivalry. 
This proposition also supports the works on sharing rules of Comes and Sandler 
(1994a, pp. 377-80), in which they argue that the incentive structure of the public good 
emerges as a natural implication of a sharing rule even when there is no technologically 
given public good. 
Note that sharing is but one forni of cooperation. Broadly speaking, any cooperative 
arrangement can be viewed as public since the outcome of cooperation affects all involved 
parties. For example, as revealed by Alchian, the establishment of property rights is to 
displace competition by destructive violence with competition by peaceful or orderiy means. 
Reduced dissipation of scare resources is generally beneficial to all members in society. 
Moreover, consider the tremendous benefits due to the enonnous increase of productivity 
brought about by specialization and division of labor. Such practice cannot take place 
without the necessary institutional and organizational arrangements facilitating transactions 
or distributions among people. From this perspective, all institutions and organizations bear 
public nature. Perhaps institutions and organizations serve as the most telling example of 
"endogenous" public nature. 
Investigating the characteristic of public goods under the choice-theoretic framework, 
as I shall argue, significantly improves the economic analysis on the problem of public good 
provision. On one hand, involved interests dedde whether and what kind of public goods 
should be provided. On the other, the provision also involves the institutional and 
29 
organizational choices for the purpose of production and exchange. Taking both into 
account, the predictive ability of economic analysis will increase. 
Consider for example the problem of ozone depletion, which causes concerns about 
the possible harmful effects to human beings of solar ultraviolet radiation. To resolve this 
problem, several approaches are conceivable. One direction is to prevent further depletion 
of the ozone layer. This can be done, for example, by banning the use of CFCs (ozone-
depleting chemicals) and seek substitute inputs for industrial purposes. Another direction is 
to eliminate or mitigate the danger of solar ultraviolet radiation. One option is to put certain 
substances in orbit/stratosphere for reflecting some portion of incoming sunlight, or reducing 
the solar ultraviolet radiation.^ '* Another altematlve may be to develop some medication for 
human resistance to the harmful effects of ultraviolet radiatlon.^  ^
The first two approaches, ban of CFCs use and the "geo-engineering" method, 
involve public goods of different kinds, which may diverge significantly in temris of the 
required extent of international cooperation. On the other hand, the medical approach may 
involve only private goods/services (e.g., personal medicines or other medical treatments), 
and not rely on any fomri of intematlonal coordination. Hence, In theory, the direct Incentive 
structure of the public good is not inevitable for solving the problem of ozone depletion. 
More spedflcally, global banning of CFCs may differ from the geo-englneering 
approach In terms of institutional and organizational difficulties.^  ^ For example, the success 
in banning or largely reducing the emissions of CFCs depend not only on the attitudes of 
such industrialized countries as the United States, European Union, but also on other rapidly 
developing and populous countries such as China. If any significant party refuses to 
Similar technical possibility has been discussed by Schelling (1992) in the problem of global 
warming. 
While the following discussion will be confined to those three approaches, it shall not be difficult to 
see that they do not exhaust all the possibilities. 
For some in-depth discussion, see. for example, Sandler (1997, chapter 4 and 5). 
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cooperate, due to the consideration of economic values generated from the industrial use of 
such chemicals, the result of this approach will hardly be optimistic. In contrast, the geo-
engineering solution might be conducted alone by some country with the required 
technology, involving perhaps no more complicated issue than cost sharing among nations. 
However, the resources required in research and development can be tremendous before 
such technology ever matures. 
Besides, compared with the geo-engineering technology, research and development 
on the medical innovation might not be a promising investment if the medication, once 
available and adopted, would use up much more of global resources for the continual 
provision of such medication for the worid population over time. In this circumstance, the 
research efforts on developing the geo-engineering technology may be expected as more 
worthwhile and thus strongly encouraged. 
In principle, under a comprehensive choice-theoretic framework, we can analyze and 
predict not only under what circumstances and in what kinds would a public good and the 
required technology be preferred, but also under what institutional and organizational 
anrangements would the public good be provided. While the above discussion has 
addressed the former to some extent, the latter is the center of the following chapter. 
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4. INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICE 
4.1. A Comprehensive Classification of Organizations 
To start the discussion, we shall review the organizational classification extended 
from the work of Hansmann (1996). Based on the ownership types, this dissertation insists 
that the classification be comprehensive. That is, institutions and organizations of all sorts 
can be included. This classification is presented in the following table. 
Table 4.1 classifies all institutions and organizations by the ownership types. There 
are three columns in the table: the first is for ownership type, the second for owner 
identification, and the third for some representative examples. As shown in the first column, 
three primary ownership arrangements are identified, including producer ownership, 
customer ownership, and absence of patron ownership. In the category of producer 
ownership, suppliers of various kinds of production factors, in principle, can be arranged as 
the organization owners. Investors of capital, for example, are the most common class of 
owners, as seen in the case of traditional business corporations. Nonetheless, collective 
ownership held by other supplier groups has still been observed in practice. Examples 
include the partnership form of such professional services as law and accounting, driver-
owned taxicab companies, worker-owned plywood cooperatives, and so on. 
The second category of ownership structure is customer ownership. In some cases, 
customer group as a whole exercises effectively the control rights. Examples are many, 
including famri supply cooperatives, wholesale and supply cooperatives, stock exchanges, 
rural electricity/telephone cooperatives, condominiums, country clubs, and so on. In some 
examples, such as farm supply cooperatives and rural utility cooperatives, members' 
patronage is usually closely measured so as to maintain a system of control rights 
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Table 4.1. Classification of organizations by ownership arrangement 
Ownership Types Owners Examples 
Investors of capital Traditional business corporations 
Producer ownership 
Suppliers of 
other factors 
Partnership (e.g., law, accounting, advertising) 
Various kinds of producer cooperatives (e.g.. 
Driver-owned taxicab companies 
Worker-owned plywood cooperatives 
Employee-owned refuse collection companies) 
Farm marketing cooperatives 
Customer ownership 
Customers 
(effective control) 
Cooperatives of farm supplies (e.g., fertilizer) 
Consumer retail cooperatives 
Wholesale and supply cooperatives 
Business-owned customer cooperatives (e.g., 
Associated Press, MasterCard, Visa 
Stock exchanges) 
Rural utility cooperatives 
Residential association and condominium 
Country clubs/social clubs 
Customers 
(attenuated control/ 
nominal) 
Mutual insurance companies 
Mutual banking institutions 
Member-controlled nonprofit organizations (e.g.. 
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) 
Some scientific and educational societies 
Political parties) 
Governments 
Absence of 
patron ownership 
None 
Religious organizations 
Some charitable organizations (e.g., 
Oxfam, CARE, American Red Cross) 
Some philanthropic foundations 
Some high-culture art-performing groups 
Some museums 
Some hospitals 
Some health maintenance organizations 
Some colleges and universities 
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proportional to their patronage, in others, such as condominiums, country dubs, one-
member-one-vote is commonly applied in the process of collective decision-making. In 
general, the owners of these organizations can exercise their property rights effectively. 
On the other hand, not all cases of collective customer ownership can be effectively 
enforced. For example, in the case of mutual insurance companies, and mutual banking 
institutions, members maintain only the right to net earnings, while the control rights are 
largely attenuated. As another example, some member-controlled nonprofits, such as 
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), allow their members to elect only a fraction of board of 
directors. Significant attenuation of ownership also includes such cases as political parties, 
and governments. 
The entire absence of patron ownership can be regarded as the maximal attenuation 
of property rights. No class of patrons is an'anged as owners. Such organizations are 
controlled and managed by the independent management or board of directors/trustees on 
the fiduciary basis. Examples includes religious organizations, some charitable 
organizations, some hospitals, museums, colleges, and so on. 
Two points about the above classification need some clarification. First, when an 
organization is collectively owned by businesses, distinction between customer and 
producer ownership may be arbitrary. For example, in the case of fanm marketing 
cooperatives, famis can be viewed either as suppliers of agricultural products to the 
mari<eting finms, or as customers of mariceting services. Therefore, many business-owned 
organizations may be labeled either as customer or producer ownership. This ambiguity, 
however, does not hinder our investigation; what is relevant is the reasons why certain class 
of patrons are arranged as owners. 
Secondly, as previously mentioned, property rights assodated with ownership are a 
matter of degree. In this dissertation, organizations under the effective ownership held by 
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some class of patrons will be termed "patron-owned" organizations. "Patron-controlled" will 
be reserved for significantly attenuated ownership. 
In this chapter, the analysis focuses on the organizational patterns of production and 
exchange for various types of public goods. The discussion is organized as follows. In the 
case where use exclusion is relatively easy, the investigation is divided into four parts: (1) 
smooth mari<et transacting; (2) transaction difficulty resulting from investment specificity and 
monopolistic power; (3) transaction difficulty resulting from asymmetric information; (4) 
change in difficulties of market transacting and collective ownership. 
In the non-excludability case, three observed resolutions are discussed, including 
indirect transaction through a third transaction party, establishment of use exclusion, and 
establishment of protection for providers' income rights. Finally a summary table is provided 
at the end. 
4.2. Use-Excludable 
4.2.1. Cases of smooth market transacting 
In the case of relatively easy use-exclusion, profitability attracts for-profit fimns to 
compete for providing the public good in question. Production and exchange efficiencies 
resulting from the profit-maximizing incentive cleariy advantage for-profit fimns, especially 
investor-owned firms, to dominate mari<ets when there are no concems about such maricet 
transacting problems as monopolistic power, investment specificity, asymmetric information, 
and so on. One primary factor for the success of investor ownership lies in the high 
homogeneity of investors' interest - maximizing the retum to their investment (Hansmann 
(1996, chapter 4)). Examples for its dominance are many, including popular recreations 
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(e.g. Disney), popular perfonning arts (e.g. Broadway), professional sports (e.g. NBA), and 
less noticed, law enforcement industry. 
Perhaps contrary to general impression, law enforcement is possible and actually 
supplied by for-profit finms in many cases. Here law enforcement refers to police, 
corrections and jails, as well as judicial services. For example, it is common that private 
security firms contract for providing security services with many private parties such as 
individual households, residential associations, corporations, hospitals, colleges, banks, 
manufacturing plants, hotels, and retail stores. Moreover, these firms also contract with 
many local govemments for providing partial or complete police services to pari(s, recreation 
areas, public housing projects, airports, nuclear test sites, city halls, courts, and so on!^  
Some studies show that, compared with govemmental agency, contracted for-profit firms 
may have significant advantages in tenns of cost saving and qualityThe same applies to 
the correction facilities and jails.^  ^ The differences may well indicate the disparity in the 
production and transaction costs under these two different organizational an'angements. 
In the judicial area, where the long pre-trial delays (greatest in civil litigation) are 
infamous in the public court system, organizational arrangements other than govemmental 
provision are also common. For example, arbitration and mediation are typically used in 
commercial and consumer disputes, medical malpractice, labor-management relations, 
neighborhoods and family strife, and environmental clashes. Also, it is observed that for-
profit finns have entered the justice maricet of "rent-a-judge" since eariy 1980s, now in 
virtually every state in the United States. For example, as of March 1987, the private 
company Judicate employed 308 judges in 45 states and has been called the "national 
See Benson (1990, pp. 180-182). 
" Ibid., pp. 184-192. 
Ibid., pp. 182-184. 
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private court," offering quick and inexpensive dispute resolution.^  These facts should not 
be surprising. As evident in the histories of customary law and the law merchant, many laws 
could be and were privately created and enforced. 
Besides the organizational form of for-profit firms, voluntary group action against 
crime has been observed in certain occasions. Some community associations have 
devoted to providing their members with a variety of programs, including youth recreation or 
employment, neighborhood improvement, property engraving protection, escort services 
and self-defense training, and surveillance patrols. While such demands may be too 
infrequent and/or limited to attract for-profit firms, governmental provision may not be 
politically viable, or suffer from inappropriate scale and inflexibility to changes of demands. 
Member-owned organizations in some cases have proved possible, owing to such favorable 
factors as small scale, members' geographical proximity, members' large stakes, and so on. 
These factors help check within a bearable range the costs associated with the collective 
member ownership. The well-documented private streets in St. Louis and University City in 
Missouri are among the conspicuous examples. 
To sum up, profitability in many use-excludable cases fosters the organizational form 
of for-profit firms, which have the advantages of efficient production and exchange due to 
the profit-maximizing Incentive. When demands are too limited to attract for-profit firms, they 
could be served by such an organizational fomi of member-owned organizations, as long as 
collective ownership held by heterogeneous members is not prohibitively costly. Compared 
with governmental provision, if viable, voluntary organizational arrangements may have 
relative advantages in terms of provision scale and flexibility in certain cases. 
 ^ ibid., pp. 223-224. 
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4.2.2. Some difficulties of producer ownership in marlcet transacting 
When concerns prevail about monopolistic power, investment specificity, asymmetric 
infomrtation, and so on, provision under the unrestricted producer ownership is often 
problematic. Instead, there may emerge such institutional and organizational arangements 
as regulated producer-owned finns, customer-owned organizations including governments 
at various levels, or nonprofit organizations. Among these alternatives, govemment 
involvement takes more than one fomn, including regulations on producer-owned firms, 
govemment aids, and direct govemment ownership. With the presence of market-
transacting difficulties. It is the established regulations, and sometimes govemment aids, 
that contribute to the viability of producer ownership. 
4.2.2.1. Investment specificity and monopolistic power 
4.2.2.1.1. Electric utilities as the polar case. We shall start our discussion with 
the example of electric utilities. Although electricity itself is not a public good, the common 
presence of legal monopolistic status with regulations or govemment ownership inevitably 
brings in public elements to the provision of electric utility. More importantly, electric utilities 
provide perhaps the most revealing demonstration, owing to the clear organizational 
patterns. In the process of deriving general principles on organizational arrangements, 
other public utilities will also be discussed. Finally, with these organizational principles, 
analysis will extend to cover another set of examples. Infrastructures, including roads, 
streets, highways, sewer systems, ports, airports, and the like. 
It is long recognized that electric utilities suffer from such maricet transacting 
problems as monopolistic power, and investment-specificity.^  ^ In short, provision of electric 
See, for example, the works on "relational contracting" of Goldberg (1976), and Williamson (1976). 
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utilities requires enormous investments of durable specific assets, such as the local 
distribution network, which will lose its value if the transaction fails to continue after the 
network is built. The utility company needs safeguard for such investments. With scale 
economy characterizing the industry of electric utility, it seems inevitable that the delegated 
authority (e.g. the govemment) will grant the firm long-tenm exclusive right to serve. 
However, the local customers as a whole then become vulnerable and need safeguard 
against monopolistic exploitation as well. Hence, delimiting the bilateral protection, some 
form of regulation, either municipal franchise contracting (prior to early twentieth century) or 
state commission regulation, is arguably necessary and has been observed over time in the 
United States (e.g.. Priest (1993)). 
However, the mere presence of both investment specificity and monopolistic power 
does not necessarily lead to the conventional rate regulations. In other words, the rate 
regulations are not the only solution. If an electric utility company can be owned by its 
customers, the exploitative incentives against either side will be largely eliminated, since 
under such an organization the interests of the fimi and its customers are highly aligned. In 
the United States, there are approximately one thousand electric utility companies organized 
as consumer cooperatives, locating in forty-six states. Not surprisingly, twenty-eight states 
do not regulate the cooperatives' rates.^  
Then the question is, why are not all companies of electric utility organized as 
consumer cooperatives, if the organizational form of electric cooperatives can avoid the 
transacting difficulties resulting from monopolistic power and investment specifidty? The 
answer lies primarily on the difficulties associated with collective ownership held by 
heterogeneous classes of customers. Supporting evidence can be found in the fact that 
 ^Among the eighteen states with rate regulation on the cooperatives, ten employ a streamlined 
procedure. See Hansmann (1996, p. 170). 
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electricity cooperatives are located almost exclusively in rural areas.^  In rural areas, farm 
and non-farm residential households fomn a dominant group of members with relatively 
homogeneous interests. On the other hand, due to large electricity demands, commercial 
and industrial usens are highly welcome as members, with substantial bargaining power in 
establishing rates.^ '* Such member composition and balance in power render relatively little 
unsolvable conflict of interests, facilitating the collective decision-making and control under 
customer ownership. 
Further evidence is provided by the fact that investor-owned fimns with rate 
regulation dominate such public utilities as water, gas, and mass transit, which are generally 
provided in metropolitan areas.^  ^ Conspicuously, the customers in metropolitan areas are 
so numerous, transient, and diverse in interests. The conflict of interests within such a 
consumer cooperative could be intense in making most decisions, such as on whether to 
make further Investments, what to invest, and how to set rates or appropriate net earnings 
among residential, commercial, and industrial customers. Moreover, it will be prohibitively 
costly to maintain capital accounts for diverse and transient urban population. Customer 
ownership In the form of consumer cooperatives is conceivably an inefficient organizational 
arrangement in urban areas. This view helps explain in part, despite of those frequently 
criticized flaws associated with rate regulations, why most electricity is still supplied by 
regulated investor-owned firms in the United States. 
According to Hansmann (1996, p. 173, and pp. 338-339), there is no discussion anfiong 
economists on this phenomenon until 1989 by Dan Alger, Frederick Warren-Boulton, and others. 
Commercial and industrial users combined account only for 10 percent of the membership, but 
their electricity demand 40 percent of the total in rural electric cooperatives. Ibid., p. 170. 
 ^Due to higher capital intensity and smaller customer base, these public utilities are rarely provided 
in rural areas. Rural households commonly get their water fi'om wells, gas in tanks and bottles, and 
own vehicles for transportation. 
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Another organizational arrangement, municipally owned electric utilities, about fifteen 
hundred in the United States, are generally located in small towns.^  Different from most 
other municipal services, the finances of a municipal utility are usually separated from those 
of the city. One significant advantage of municipal ownership over utility cooperatives is the 
sizable saving of costs incum'ng in maintaining capital accounts for diverse and transient 
municipal population. 
As one form of customer ownership, the diversity and transience of municipal 
customers might have been expected to result in considerable conflict of interests, as 
previously discussed. However, while the class of residential customers is the dominant 
voter group, the commercial and industrial customers are rather influential in local politics 
due to their bargaining advantages. First, raising their electricity rates are likely to be 
reflected in higher prices for locally procured goods and services. Besides, it is often a 
credible threat by commercial and industrial customers to exit the municipality, or to seek 
electricity source outside the community. Such balance among different interests, as seen 
in rural utility cooperatives, is easier to achieve in small communities than in large ones. 
The potential of pathologies resulting from contentious politics in large dties was 
actually recognized by commercial and industrial utility users, as well as utility companies. It 
Is this coalition that lobbied in the eariy twentieth century for displacing municipal regulation 
by state commission regulation,which are rather far away from local political wrestling. 
Compared with the above two organizational forms (e.g., producer ownership and 
customer ownership), municipal ownership suffers from the disadvantage of adjusting to 
technological change, which has since 1920s increased the efficient scale of electricity 
 ^ in a 1986 survey, 80 percent of the responding 496 municipal utilities served fewer than 15,000 
customers. See American Public Power/Usodation (1987). 
 ^Many businessmen, under the auspices of the National Civic Federation, supported the change of 
regulatory regime. See Schap (1986, p. 22), or Anderson (1981, pp. 44-48). 
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generation. One possible explanation for the disadvantage is that the heterogeneity of 
municipalities prevents the adjustment in production scale by mutual cooperation. In 
contrast, rural utility cooperatives have been able to adopt a federation structure, from local 
distribution cooperatives to regional electricity generating and transmission (G&T) 
cooperatives. The inability to cooperate among municipalities may be attributable to their 
heterogeneity in size and composition. A long-tenn tendency is observed by Schap (1986) 
that municipal ownership has been gradually displaced by regulated investor ownership. 
To sum up, despite of the efficiency resulting from the clear goal of an investor-
owned firm to maximize the return of its capital, concerns arise with the presence of such 
transaction difficulties as of investment specificity and monopolistic power. For-profit 
customer cooperatives can largely avoid not only the transaction difficulties, but also those 
flaws associated with the rate regulation. However, the costs of collective customer 
ownership detemiine whether this organizational fomn is viable. Municipal ownership, while 
solving the same problems, is less responsive to mari<et and its changes. As any form of 
customer ownership, its success or viability also depends on the difficulties associated with 
the collective ownership held by heterogeneous interests. In the case where the collective 
customer ownership is significantly inefficient, regulated investor ownership may become a 
desirable organizational anrangement. 
4.2.2.1.2. Infrastructure. The above conclusions in organizational choices may 
generally apply to the provision of roads, streets, highways, sewer systems, ports, airports, 
and the like. To elaborate, first, all these cases involve large amount of specific durable 
investment. For the provision of these public facilities, it is necessary for all users to act as a 
whole through delegated authority entering into exclusive contracts, since these fadlities 
requires integrated and coordinated schemes. Decentralized market contracting and 
competition among individual users and firms are likely to lead to undesirable outcome. 
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Once the provider's monopolistic position is legally established on one side, users need to 
seek safeguard against monopolistic exploitation on the other. 
User ownership in the form of for-profit consumer cooperatives is extremely difficult 
in these cases. First, these facilities are either provided in urban areas, or cover vast 
regions involving large and dispersed population of different jurisdictions. Diversity of user 
interests can be drastic. Moreover, these facilities strongly affect local interests other than 
those of providers and direct users. Take airports as an example. Directly involved are not 
only the interests of airport providers, airlines, airline patrons, businesses within an airport, 
but also those of residential and commercial neighbors of an airport. Collective ownership 
held by direct users, even if possible, does not address all interests strongly involved. 
In contrast, while avoiding the prohibitive burden of maintaining individual capital 
accounts, government ownership allows the collective decision-making and control of some 
degree by all involved interests through political process. This is because under the system 
of private property a govemment is collectively owned by their taxpayers by construction. 
Compared with consumer/user cooperatives, govemment ownership evidently has relative 
advantages in the provision of infrastructures. 
However, it is not immediately clear whether govemment ownership also has similar 
advantages over regulated investor ownership. The nonprofit nature of govemment 
ownership results in notorious agency costs of various sorts. When regulated investor 
ownership cleariy dominates govemment ownership in the case of urban public utilities, it is 
interesting to observe the ovenvhelming dominance of govemment ownership in the case of 
infrastructures. Such an observation needs closer investigation. 
Take airports as example. Except small airports for general aviation purpose, most 
airports for large air carriers are owned by local governments so far. Military concerns 
prevailed at the formative stage of modem air transportation in 1920s. It helps explain why 
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governments have been actively involved in this area. Airline industry started to grow after 
World War II, and has gained its importance in transportation among developed countries 
since the end of 1950s. So-called "privatization fever" since 1980s seems to have started 
the trend of organizational conversion into regulated investor ownership in the provision of 
aviation-related public facilities such as airports. 
Several forms of contractual and organizational arrangements have been observed, 
including public incorporation of govemmental subsidiaries, long-temn lease contracts, joint 
ventures with private companies, certain forms of split ownership, and so on. The 
conversion of British Airports Authority (BAA) into a private company, BAA pic., in 1987 may 
be one of the best-known examples.^  ^ In the United States, several sizable airports, such as 
Rickenbacker field in Ohio, Mom'stown airport in New Jersey, and others, have been leased 
to investor-owned fimns.^  The Alliance Airport, opened in December 1989, was developed 
by the Perot Group and the City of Forth Worth. In this case, 418 out of total 3,400 acres of 
property is owned by the city for runway/taxiway use.®' In New York, the J.F. Kennedy 
airport is a govemment-owned facility with its tenninals owned and managed by private 
airiines (Doganis (1992, p. 13)). 
In the case of roads and highways, in contrast, the protection of firms' exclusion and 
income rights to the toll facilities is relatively costly and highly vulnerable to unfavorable 
regulatory settings. For example, by the middle of the nineteenth century, most of eariy 
tumpike companies had gone bankrupt owing to such factors as restrictions on the location 
of toll gates, legally permitting routes bypassing toll gates, and excessive toll exemption, as 
argued by Klein (1990, pp. 789-795). The use of indirect charges such as "shadow tolls" 
 ^The seven airports owned by BAA accounted for about three-fourths of all passenger traffic in the 
United Kingdom. See Ashford and Moore (1992, p. 2). 
 ^Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
I^bid., p. 91. 
44 
also relies on legislative and administrative supports from the government. Moreover, 
voiced by automobile and trucking associations, as well as some govemment agencies, 
opposition against private toll ways has been politically influential. 
However, gradual change in the organizational choice has been observed since 
decades ago. As regulatory knowledge and tolling techniques grow, the provision of roads 
and highways become a less risky business. Aided by the advance of financial institutions, 
concerns have been gradually mitigated over problems of capital-raising and insurance 
against inflation, exchange-rate fluctuations, legal liability, or political instability. Political 
opposition is expected to continually decline as the problem of double charging is 
improved.^  ^ Regulated investor ownership becomes more viable over time. When 
appropriate regulations are available as the safeguard against the possible exploitation of 
investor-owned firms, the organizational efficiency due to the profit-seeking incentive can be 
maintained to significant degree. 
So-called "Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) approach" has been observed since 1970s 
and 1980s for private investment for the infrastructure development. The BOT, sometimes 
called BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfer), involves usually a consortium of private 
companies to finance, design, build, operate, and maintain some form of revenue-producing 
Infrastructure project for a specific period, typically 20 to 40 years. Such a project may be 
for constructing a power plant, airport, toll road, bridge, tunnel, or water treatment plant. 
The BOT approach has several variations, including Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT), Build-
Transfer-Operate (BTO), Build-Operate-Renewal of concession (BOR), Build-Own-Operate 
(BOO), and others. The use of toll, toll rate and/or rate of retum are commonly under 
regulations. By 1995, Arizona, Califomia, Florida, Minnesota, South Carolina, Texas, 
A common complaint among toll payers is about the extensive taxes on vehicle ownership and 
usage, such as purchase tax. annual license fees, taxes on fuel, tires, and other vehicle parts. 
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Virginia, and Washington have enacted legislation to authorize private toll projects on the 
basis of either BOT or its variations?  ^ Toll facilities are even more common in Europe, and 
some other regions.^  
To conclude, with technological and regulatory progresses, regulated investor 
ownership has been competing with govemment ownership in the provision of 
infrastructures. Unlike such public utilities as electricity and telephone, the fomri of 
consumer cooperatives is not viable, due to its prohibitive costs incurring in operating the 
collective ownership. In order to solve the problems of investment specificity and 
monopolistic power, our analysis maintains that govemment involvement is necessary and 
takes the form of either direct ownership or regulations on investor-owned firms. Moreover, 
our analysis predicts that regulated investor ownership will become the dominant fonn for 
the provision of infrastructures in time, due to the organizational efficiency, though limited, 
associated with the investor ownership. 
4.2.2.2. Asymmetric information 
The presence of informational gap between transacting parties may affect the 
organizational arrangements of production and exchange in many cases. Take for example 
such traditional charities as American Red Cross. Donors in a sense purchase services 
delivered to third parties with which the donors have little or no contact. The result is a 
radical case of asymmetric infomiation (IHansmann (1996, pp. 229-230)). If such a charity 
was provided by an investor-owned firm, credibility would be a frequent question. The 
evident absence of investor ownership in the business of traditional charities suggests the 
credibility difficulty resulting from asymmetric infomnation could be prohibitive. 
 ^See Roth (1996, p.185), and Poole (1996. pp. 170-171). 
 ^See Roth (1996, chapter 7), and Poole (1996, pp. 168-169) 
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Alternatively, if the firm were organized as a donor-owned organization, its incentive 
to exploit its informational advantage would be largely eliminated. However, in the case of 
traditional charities, donors are numerous, dispersed, and transient, and their contributions 
are typically in such small amounts. Any effort to maintaining the collective ownership by 
those contributors would cost more than it would be worth. This example demonstrates 
once more that the main challenge for customer ownership lies in the difficulties of collective 
ownership held among heterogeneous customers. 
The nonprofit form with the fiduciary and independent management avoids the 
problems related to both transaction and ownership as mentioned above. The legal 
constraint of retaining net eamings, if any, within the nonprofit eliminates donors' concems 
about the exploitative incentives of investor-owners. Also, the nonprofit form of this type 
saves all the costs associated with the collective donor ownership. Although such nonprofits 
generally suffer from capital immobility, which results from lack of equity financing and 
retum-maximizing incentive (Hansmann (1996, pp. 238-241)), their prominent role in the 
provision of human services such traditional charities might suggest net gains be positive in 
organizational efficiency. 
This argument may be supported and further refined by observing some member-
controlled nonprofits (e.g., PBS) where members have the power to elect only a fraction of 
board of directors. Compared with traditional charity nonprofits, such nonprofits' members 
are expected to be less numerous, more geographically concentrated, more aligned in 
interests, and/or have great deal at stake with the organizations, in other words, the 
difficulties of maintaining collective ownership are relatively small in the case of member-
controlled nonprofits. As in the previous discussion on voluntary group action against crime, 
some community organizations or voluntary professional assodations are such an example. 
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Hence, it has been argued that the forms of nonprofit and member ownership clearly blurred 
into each other at the margins.^  
What if those traditional charities are exclusively provided by the government 
agencies? Since vast taxpayers or voters might support different or even conflicting policies 
on these issues, any decision through political process might involve significant compromise 
and hardly be expected as satisfactory. Wide dissatisfaction of "forced riding", or more 
likely, paucity or absence of charity provision may be the common outcome. 
In contrast, one advantage of the nonprofit form becomes clear; donation financing 
serves as a "voluntary price discrimination" through which higher demanders for a charity 
contribute more to the provision. The result has to be Pareto-efficient. Interestingly, data 
shows that people do make significant donations for charities (e.g., Rose-Ackerman (1996)). 
Besides the problem of "purchase for the remote third party" characterizing traditional 
charities, other examples of infomiational difficulties are many. In the cases of private 
primary/secondary schools, and four-year private colleges, Hansmann (1996, pp. 232-233) 
proposed the argument of voluntary repayment or "implicit loan" system to explain why, in 
these cases, donations come almost entirely from their own alumni (previous customers). 
The main theme is that, since it is difficult for an individual to pledge human capital as 
security for an education loan, mari<et supply of such loans will be inadequate. The 
nonprofit form solves this problem by charging tuition below cost, in retum for an implicit 
commitment of future donations as "repayment." On the other hand, the marginal increment 
to the educational service by individual donations is difficult to measure. The nonprofit form 
hence also provides alumni a safeguard by avoiding the exploitative incentive under investor 
ownership. One testable implication of the above analysis is that, if government is to 
 ^ See Hansmann (1996, chapter 13,14) on the mutual form in the insurance and banking business 
for more detailed discussion. 
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provide a more generous system of grants and loans, for-profit institutions would compete 
more effectively with nonprofit institutions in education. 
From the discussion of the above cases, three factors are argued as the possible 
reasons why nonprofit organizations have been frequently observed: (1) infomnational 
difficulty in deciding the marginal increment of services attributable to individual contribution, 
(2) the possibility of voluntary contribution, and (3) costs of collective customer/donor 
ownership. These three factors also help explain the significant presence of nonprofits in 
the provision of high-culture performing arts, museums, and libraries. Note that those 
services are characterized by the high ratio of fixed to marginal costs, reflecting the fact of 
limited demands. Limited demands suggest slim profitability, and hence the possible 
difficulty for a for-profit firm in survival. Limited demands also suggest that government 
financing by general tax revenue not necessarily be politically feasible. 
In conclusion, when the presence of asymmetric information hinders the viability of 
Investor ownership, the nonprofit form with fiduciary and independent management may 
emerge to mitigate the problem if the conditions for customer ownership are highly 
unfavorable. Government provision is also an altemative, but not always viable through 
political process. Examples include such services as high-culture perfomning arts 
characterized by the limited demands, and traditional charities, which deliver mostly private 
benefits to certain groups of people. If govemment regulations or aids can eliminate the 
difficulties caused by asymmetric information, as in the case of education loan programs, 
investor ownership may become feasible. 
4.2.2.3. Change in the difficulties of transaction and ownership 
According to the above analysis, change in the difficulties of either mari<et 
transacting or collective customer ownership may lead to the change in organizational 
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arrangements. Such change may result from technological or legal advances. In the case 
of traditional charities, for example, fast-advancing technology of electronic information 
systems might eventually overcome the difficulties in communication and decision-making 
among numerous and dispersed donors. Donor ownership would then turn into a promising 
organizational form. Such implications derived from the above analysis are empirically 
testable. 
Legal institutions, including various kinds of government regulations, may also 
change some transaction and/or ownership difficulties that constitute the major obstacles 
against certain organizational an-angements. Such legal development may result from the 
growth of human knowledge and evolution of values. For example, publicly traded 
corporations or nonprofits may have become more viable due to the reduction of agency 
costs, resulting from the advance of rigorous accounting standards, extensive mandated 
disclosure, prohibitions on insider trading, procedural rules facilitating litigation, and so on. 
On the other hand, interest competition also molds legal institutions. As mentioned 
previously, coalition of many business interests succeeded in displacing municipal 
regulation with state commission regulation on public utilities in eariy twentieth century. 
Such development reduces the negative influence of customer diversity on the operation of 
investor-owned utilities. The viability of the organizational form of investor ownership is 
therefore enhanced. 
4.3. Use Non-Excludable 
When use exclusion for a good/service is difficult, the interests involved will attempt 
to solve the difficulty. Once use exclusion and/or exclusive income rights are established. 
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the above analysis applies in general. In this section, four possible resolutions are 
discussed as follows. 
4.3.1. Tie-in transactions 
When the direct transaction of a good/service is considerably costly, such a 
good/service may be tied with the less costly transaction of other related goods/services. 
This is a frequently observed business practice, applying generally to the cases where the 
use exclusion of a public good is difficult. Bradford and Hildebrandt (1977), and Sandmo 
(1973) have long recognized the importance of goods' complementarity in enhancing the tie-
in transactions. Such contractual arrangements require little direct government intervention 
since the non-excludability difficulty is resolved by including the non-excludable 
good/service in the transaction of an excludable good/service. 
For example, in a rental high-rise apartment building, it is considerably costly to 
directly charge the tenants each time when they are using the common elevator. 
Frequently, the price for the elevator service is included in the rents of apartments, with 
different charges depending on the floor of the apartments. Although those most frequent 
users might be able to free-ride under such a pricing arrangement, such an arrangement 
saves the sizable costs of exclusion. In other words, tying the service of the common 
facilities with the transaction of the apartments makes it possible to drcumvent the exclusion 
problem. 
As another example, building a small dam on a public creek may enhance or 
generate the recreational value of the creek. However, it is considerably costly, if not 
impossible, for the dam builder/owner to directly charge for the enhanced recreational 
function of the creek. To avoid the non-excludability difficulty, the dam owner might tie the 
sen/ice of the dam with the transaction of such recreational business as the rental and/or 
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sale of canoes, tour canoeing, fishing trips, and other related services. By ways of tie-in 
transaction, the non-excludability difficulty of the dam service can be resolved without the 
govemmental involvement. 
4.3.2. Indirect transactions via a third transaction party 
When the direct transaction, say, between A and B is considerably costly, indirect 
transaction could be done if less costly through the transaction between A and C, when 
there is also some transaction between B and C. This is not an uncommon business 
practice, which applies generally to the cases where a public good involves in the 
transaction between A and B. Such contractual arrangements require little direct 
governmental intervention. 
For example, different from the other visual and audio entertainment such as movie 
making, it is difficult for television/radio broadcasting companies to directly charge the 
widespread and transient audience for the programs they provide. However, this difficulty 
has been overcome for broadcasting companies by charging their paying customers — 
business purchasers of commercial broadcasting, which in turn pass their advertisement 
expenditures to the audience. The provision of television/radio programs is essentially 
compensated in an indirectly way. From another viewpoint, popular television/radio 
programs attract large audience, and thus generate the value of and revenue from sales of 
commercial broadcasting. A broadcasting company has to maintain the popularity of its 
programs in order to attract the buyers of its commercial broadcasting. 
As another example, in a shopping mall, some highly well-known firms are generally 
the primary sources of attraction to customers for all businesses and stores within. These 
popular firms may also contribute to the increased land value for the landowners. In this 
sense, their reputation capitals are public goods for all other businesses and landowners. 
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The absence of direct charge for the service of their reputation capitals suggests strongly 
the enormous costs associated with direct measurement. In practice, nonetheless, indirect 
compensation is commonly observed in the contractual an^angements. Those finns with 
high reputations often pay low or no rents to landowners for the occupied space, while other 
firms pay high rents for doing their businesses in the shopping mall. As a public good, the 
service of reputation capitals is not free of charge.^  
4.3.3. Establishment of use exclusion 
As shown in the literature of common pool resources, where exclusion of resource 
use is originally absent, people involved might succeed in establishing the agreed-upon 
rules for resource use and cost sharing. In essence, the problem of common pool resources 
concerns the establishment and enforcement of property rights, which require a group 
agreement backed up by group sanctions of various kinds. Member-owned organizations, 
mediation, court rulings, and legislation have been observed in many cases. For example, 
well-documented cases for those member-owned organizations are numerous, including 
high mountain meadows and forests in some villages in Switzeriand and Japan; and 
irrigation systems in some areas in Spain and Philippines (Ostrom (1990, chapter 3)). When 
the problems of common pool resources involve vast population and regions, resolutions by 
court mlings or legislation become more feasible. 
The difficulty of collective ownership held by different interests is the main challenge 
to those organizational arrangements. The degree of difficulty is positively related to the 
number and heterogeneity of group members, and negatively to the size of the aggregate 
expected gains from the institutional establishment, as forcefully argued by Libecap (1989), 
 ^Although the example of shopping mails may have long been familiar among economists, formal 
empirical studies are recent. See Pashigian and Gould (1998). 
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and others. When the difficulty is too costly to overcome, a group agreement will fail to 
come in a timely manner, or even fail to come at all. Infamous deterioration in fisheries and 
crude oil production supports this view. 
4.3.4. Establishment of income right to the service provided 
In the case of profitable service provision with non-excludability difficulty, the main 
concem is about how to secure the exclusive income right of providers to the revenue-
generating service. With the aid of govemment legislation of protecting provider's income 
right, the profit-seeking incentive can be preserved to induce efficiencies of production and 
exchange. For example, the subscription services of fire control exist in many states such 
as Arizona, Georgia, Oregon, Montana, Tennessee, and so on. State legislation permits a 
for-profit fimri to charge non-subscribers for its services afterwards, and the firm usually 
adopts a pricing policy encouraging subscription. Studies by Pool (1980, pp. 62-78) and 
others also indicate the advantages of for-profit fimis in temns of cost savings. Copyright, 
and patent are also classic examples. When legislation secures profitability, producer 
ownership usually demonstrates its superiority in terms of efficiency. In other words, the 
viability of producer ownership relies on the assistance of govemment legislation in these 
cases. 
However, the legislative process is one of interest competition. Establishing such 
income rights might encounter intense interest conflicts, which result from tremendous 
heterogeneity of those involved. In the case of fire-fighting service, for-profit firms often fail 
in legislative battles due to severe objection from the existing interest of govemment 
employees in charge of such service. Likewise, protection of intellectual property rarely 
progresses smoothly in history. 
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In conclusion, with the opportunity of tie-in transaction, non-excludability and other 
transacting difficulties can be resolved. Examples, among others, include common facilities 
tied with the transaction of the apartments, and dam service tied with some related 
recreational business. When a common third transaction party is available, some 
transaction difficulties between both sides of transaction may be solved through the indirect 
transactions with the common third. Commercial broadcasting and shopping malls provide 
clear illustration. Private contracting in these cases works well without the assistance of 
direction govemment intervention. 
In the case of establishing the mles for governing the common pool resources, the 
cost of collective decision-making by competing interests plays a pivotal role, as in the case 
of establishing providers' income rights. The higher the associated cost will be the more 
numerous and heterogeneous the involved interests are. As in any case involving collective 
decision-making, the success in establishing exclusive rights to the common pool resources 
rests on the homogeneity of the involved interests. 
4.4. Summary 
The main conclusions in this chapter can be summarized in the following table. 
Table 4.2 contains four columns, including ownership types, organizational forms, 
associated characteristics and examples. First of all, the previous three main categories, 
producer, customer, and absence of patron ownership, are essentially identical except for 
two modifications. The first is the inclusion of regulated producer ownership, which consists 
of two organizational elements; producer ownership and regulations by the govemment, 
which is a form of customer ownership. The other is the separation of govemment 
ownership from the general customer ownership, merely for the convenience of explication. 
Table 4.2. Summary of organizational arrangement of public good provision 
Ownership Types Organizational Choice Characteristics Examples 
Producer 
Ownership 
Investor-owned firms 
Other producer-owned firms 
Under smooth market transacting 
Profit-seeking incentives 
Efficiency advantage due to 
homogeneity of owner interests 
Popular recreations 
Popular performing arts 
Law enforcement 
Regulated 
Producer Ownership 
Producer-owned firms under 
government regulations 
Solving transacting difficulties 
Limited profit-seeking incentives 
Reliance on regulatory quality 
Urban utilities 
Infrastructures 
For-profit 
customer cooperatives 
Solving transacting difficulties 
Profit-seeking incentives 
Reliance on aligned interests of customers 
Rural electricity/telephone 
cooperatives 
Customer 
Ownership Member-owned organizations 
Solving transacting difficulties 
Benefit-maximizing incentives 
Reliance on aligned interests of members 
Community associations for 
crime control, common property 
Condominium/housing cooperatives 
Member-controlled 
organizations 
Solving transacting and ownership difficulties 
Attenuated benefit-maximizing incentives 
Reliance on aligned interests of members 
and voluntary contribution 
Charities 
Government 
Ownership 
Governments 
Government-owned 
Enterprises 
Solving transacting difficulties 
Lack of profit-seeking Incentives 
Vulnerability to interest diversity 
Legislative, administrative, 
and judicial bodies 
Municipal utilities 
Infrastructures 
Absence of 
patron ownership 
Donation-financing 
nonprofits 
Solving transacting and ownership difficulties 
Lack of profit-seeking incentives 
Reliance on voluntary contribution 
Charities 
High-culture broadcasting 
High-culture performing arts 
Museums 
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Moreover, the organizational forms, as previously discussed, are specified in the 
second column, and examples given in the fourth. For instance, investor-owned firms and 
lawyer-owned fimis (partnership) have been discussed in the case of popular recreations, 
popular performing arts, and law enforcement. 
Regulated producer-owned firms were investigated in the case of urban utilities, and 
infrastructures such as roads, and airports. For-profit customer cooperatives (e.g., mral 
electricity cooperatives), govemment-owned businesses (e.g., municipally owned electric 
companies, and infrastnjctures) were also analyzed in the case of electricity utilities. 
Member-owned or member-controlled organizations have been discussed in the 
case of community associations for crime control, and common property govemance, as 
well as some charities. In the problem of common pool resource, in addition, government's 
legislative, regulatory, and judiciary actions were also mentioned. Finally, nonprofits with 
pure donation-financing were the focus of discussion for charities, high-culture broadcasting 
and performing arts. 
The third column summarizes the most important characteristics for various kinds of 
organizational anrangements mentioned above. For example. Investor-owned firms perform 
well under the condition of smooth market transacting, with the evident advantages of 
organizational efficiency, owing to its highly homogeneous owner group, and its clear goal -
maximizing the return to invested capital. It also implies that the limitation of this 
organizational fonm lies in the various kinds of transacting difficulties. 
Regulated producer ownership may resolve certain transaction difficulties, and hence 
shows its possible advantage over unregulated producer ownership. However, regulations 
also limit fimfis' profit-maximizing incentive. Regulations can be inappropriate in the sense 
that the loss owing to attenuated profit-maximizing incentive exceeds the benefit of 
preventing potential hami of transacting difficulties. Appropriate regulations can take long 
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time to develop, along with the gradual evolution of knowledge and/or social values. 
Moreover, interest conflicts can hinder the emergence of ideal regulations. Hence, reliance 
on the quality of regulatory regimes constitutes the major disadvantage of such 
organizational form. 
Customer ownership can largely mitigate most of market-transacting difficulties. 
However, compared with investors of capital, customers as the owner group are often 
relatively heterogeneous. The more diverse the customer group is the more costly the 
collective ownership will be. Although reducing the degree of control by diverse owners 
avoids such costs, it also weakens the maximizing incentives and the associated efficiency. 
As one of (attenuated) customer ownership, government ownership features the same 
advantages and disadvantages as mentioned above. Reliance on the aligned interests of 
customers is the major limitation of customer ownership. 
Finally, cancellation of patron ownership resolves certain transacting difficulties while 
avoiding the costs associated with patron ownership. These resulting benefits have to be so 
enonmous as to justify the sacrifice of profit or benefit maximizing incentives. Moreover, the 
possibility of voluntary contributions determines whether donation-financing nonprofits are 
viable. 
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5. A SIMPLE FORMAL MODEL 
This static model is planned to cover the choice of three simple organizational forms; 
(1) producer-owned fimis and the product market, (2) member-owned organizations, (3) 
donation-financing nonprofits. Besides, some other related issues will also be addressed in 
this chapter, such as organizational alternatives serving as the safeguard for transacting 
problems, and the role of organization-specific benefits in the organizational choice. While a 
static framework is chosen in this chapter, my modeling here shall be regarded as an initial 
attempt in a long-term process of building a dynamic model. Dynamic settings shall allow 
more room for characterizing such time-related issues as interest competition and path 
dependence in the problem of institutional and organizational evolution. Nonetheless, with 
this static model I will aim at elaborating some fundamental organizational determinants that 
are less likely to change over time. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows: first, the product market and investor-
owned firms will be analyzed, followed by the discussion of member-owned organizations. 
In section 5.3, the primary themes of organizational choice for public good provision will be 
briefly discussed. Then the elaboration of organizational altematives checking transacting 
problems will precede the discussion of the issue of organization-specific benefits. Finally, 
donation-financing nonprofits for the provision of public goods will be addressed. 
5.1. Basic Settings of the Product Market 
To begin with, suppose there are H consumers who differ in preferences and 
endowments. Let i denote a consumer, and i = 1, 2 H. It is also assumed that there are 
59 
only two kinds of consumption goods in this society. One is a private good, denoted as y, 
which is treated as the numeraire. The other, denoted as X, is a shared/public good with the 
following feature: once good X is provided, its capacity/quality available to all consumers is 
identical; however, a consumer i may choose its individual utilization level/extent of good X, 
denoted as x'- For example, while the capacity of a road is fixed to all users during some 
time period, the uses of the road by different users depend on their individual needs. In 
notation, x' = x' X, V i, where x' denotes individual consumption level/extent of good X. It Is 
assumed that 0 < x' ^  I. v i. This common feature characterizes a large number of public 
goods, including roads, streets, bridges, highways, sewer systems, ports, airports, 
lighthouses, water-supply or flood-control dams, museums, libraries, national pari<s, high-
culture radio broadcasting, and so on. 
Assume a consumer's utility function is 
u' = u'(y', x'), V i, 
which follows the conventional assumptions on utility function; I.e., strict quasi-concavity and 
Increasing with respect to its arguments y' and x'  ^x' X). Suppose consumers buy good y in 
the mari<et from its producers. On the other hand, there are at least two different 
altematives for the production and exchange of good X. One is that consumers pay for their 
use of good X to its producer(s) in the market. Consumers can also collectively choose to 
form a member-owned organization/club, which provides shared good X. 
Under the first organizational arrangement of producing and exchanging good X, 
consumers pay a price for using good X provided by a firm. Note that even if the 
consumption benefit of good X is non-excludable, the firm's right to income generated from 
providing good X can still be protected and secured through legislation. The subscription of 
fire protection is one such example. Here p represents the true price of consuming good X 
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in the market. That is, p is composed not only of the monetary price paid, but also of such 
transacting costs as those of searching, bargaining, waiting, and so on. Let Pf denote the 
monetary price charged by a finm, and p't denote the consumer i's transacting cost so the 
true price, denoted as p' = Pf + pV Consequently, a consumer's resource constraint be 
y' + (Pf + p't)x'X = r, Vi, 
where I' denotes resource endowment for consumer i. 
Incorporating the resource constraint in the consumer's utility function, consumer i 
solve the following maximizing problem; 
Max,;^ , V = u'(r - (p, + p'O x' X, x' X), V i. 
s.t. 0 < I' - (Pf + p't) x' X, 
0 <x' ^  1-
The solution x'* =x'(''. Pf. P't. X), and indirect utility function is 
v" = u'(l' - (Pf + p',) x'* X, x" X) = v'(l'. Pf, p'„ X), V i. 
On the supply side of the market transaction, assume the cost function of the for-
profit firm is 
C'(a, p, 5', e), 
where (1) a denotes the cost element of producing and maintaining good X, (2) |3 denotes 
the cost associated with use congestion, (3) 5' denotes the total of various costs, bore by the 
investor-owned firm, incum'ng in the process of maricet transacting, and (4) e' is the cost of 
collective decision-making by the professional investors of capital. 
In some details, as the standard cost function of production, let a = a(X,x )^, where 
X  ^= S"i=i x'. and assume that ax, Oj, axx. <hz>0, where ax, o ,^ axx, and a  ^denote the first 
and second degree of derivatives with respect to X and x\ respectively. a(X, x )^ is 
detemiined by current state of production technology. In general, the production cost is 
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positively related to the capacity/quality of good X, and the maintenance cost is also 
positively related to the aggregate utilization level/extent of customers. 
Secondly, the congestion cost, p, is expected as positively related to the aggregate 
utilization level/extent of customers, and negatively to the capacity/quality of good X. In 
notation, p = p(x ,^ X), assuming p  ^= 3p/5x  ^> 0, p j^ h a^p/(5x )^^  > 0, Px = SP/SX < 0, pxx = 
52p/(5X)^  < 0. 
Thirdly, S' denotes various kinds of transacting costs under the organizational 
arrangement of the market of good X provided by the investor-owned firm(s). Not only does 
S' include such costs as of license application, bribery, and the like, but also costs resulting 
from various kinds of transacting difficulties, such as investment specificity, informational 
asymmetry, and so on. Hence, S' could be enomnous in some cases, while negligible in 
others. Here, it is assumed that 5' is related only to other exogenous factors than the 
capacity/quality of good X or the utilization levels of all customers. 
Finally, as the cost of ownership exercising by relatively homogeneous investors, 
is expected as relatively low, compared with such an arrangement as customer ownership. 
Hence, e' is argued as one primary cost advantage of the investor-owned firm. It is also 
assumed here that e' is unaffected by the provision level and customer utilization. 
In summary for the above cost elements, the cost function for the investor-owned 
firm is denoted as 
Cf(X, xV C'(a(X, X )^. P(X  ^ X), 5', E'). 
Note that it can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure the cost elements a, p, 
and e' individually. Much input may have the joint-product feature, contributing to in the 
process of both production and exchange. For example, a foreman may not only help 
directly the production, but also provide the management or owners with valuable 
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information on workers' needs. A lawyer may not only help negotiate a contract, deal with 
regulatory authority, but also give recommendations if asked by owners in the process of 
making decisions. Hence, production costs and various sorts of transactions costs 
frequently cannot be separated. However, knowing the existence of transaction costs 
enables us to estimate the total of all relevant costs under different organizational 
an'angements. The ability of at least ranking the total costs under different arrangements 
makes possible empirical study on organizational choices. 
Therefore, the investor-owned firm solves X, Pf, and n for the profit-maximizing 
problem as follows: 
Max,^  p „ {l%  ^PrxtPf. X)-X - C'(a(X, x )^. P(X  ^X), S', s')} 
s.t. X, n, p, > 0, 
where x'(Pf. X) is the suppressed form of x'(l'. Pr. p't. The first-order conditions associated 
with X, n and pr, respectively, are 
an/ax = l Pf(x' + x'x-X) - [C a(ax + Oxlix'x) + cVcPx + Px-Six'x)]  ^o, 
x>o. xan/ax = o (1), 
an/an = prx"x - [C.-a^x" + cVPxx"! ^  o, 
n ^ 0, n an/an = 0 (2), 
and 
an/apf ^  l (x' + PrXp)X - (C'ao, + cfpP -^dix'p) < o, 
pf > 0, pran/apf=o (3), 
where x'x = ax'/ax, x'p = ax'/apf, c'a = acVaa, and c p = acVap. 
To interpret, when non-negativity constraints are not binding, equation (1) requires 
that profit-maximizing capacity of good X should be chosen such that marginal revenue from 
the inaemental capacity of good X equals the total of marginal costs resulting from 
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production, maintenance, and net congestion. Equation (2) shows that the profit-maximizing 
firm will choose the number of customers such that marginal revenue from serving an 
additional customer equals the total of marginal costs resulting from increased maintenance 
and congestion. Similarly, equation (3) means that the optimal pricing should be decided in 
such a way that marginal revenue equals the total of marginal costs associated with 
maintenance and congestion, owing to the price-induced change of customer utilization. 
The profit-maximizing solutions for X, n, and Pf, denoted as X*, n*. and Pf*. 
respectively, will be functions of T, p't, s\ and so on. Under the organizational 
aaangement of the maritet of good X provided by the investor-owned firm(s), the individual 
I's indirect utility function is then defined as 
v'* = u'(r - (p,' + p\) x'' X*. V i, 
where x'* = x'C'. PP't. X*)-
5.2. An Alternative: A Customer/Member-Owned Organization 
Under the alternative arrangement, the consumers may form a member-owned 
organization for the provision of the shared good X. Assume the consumers agree to share 
all the costs associated with the organization; that is, the financing of full cost-sharing is 
pursued by the organization. Let 6' denote the agreed-upon fraction shared by the 
consumer i of total costs, and hence 
0' e [0, I], V i. and L 0' = I. 
Note that, due to the assumption of full cost-sharing, the individual cost-sharing fractions 
can be denoted as the functions of the group size, n, and negatively related to n on average. 
That is, let 0' = 0'(n), a function of the group size, and it follows that /^dn = -l/(n  ^< 0, 
where 0 = L 0Vn = l/n. 
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Also, let 0 = (0\ 6  ^ 0"). the vector of individual cost-sharing fractions under a 
specific cost sharing rule, V 0 € O, where 0 denote the set of all possible rules for cost 
sharing. For example, in notation, 6' = l/n, V i, representing the equal-sharing rule. The 
sharing rule based on the ability to pay may be denoted as 0' = l'/(Zj I'), V i. When the 
principle of benefit proportionality is adopted, it may be expressed as 0' = s'/(L s'), V i, 
where s' represents consumer i's total benefit/satisfaction given certain amount of good X. 
That is, let p' = p'(x) be the inverse demand for good X of consumer i, and s' = lqpXq)dq, q 
e[0, X], V i. Although in the above cases, individual share fraction 0' is negatively related to 
the number of members, it is not generally true that d0'/dn < 0. Conceivably, the agreed-
upon sharing rule could require only the richest member pay for all costs. Then the 
individual share fractions for the rest do not vary as n increases. 
Let all costs associated with the member-owned organization be denoted as 
C(a, p, 5, e, 0), 
where (1) a denotes the cost element associated with producing and maintaining the good 
X, (2) p denotes the cost associated with use congestion, (3) 5 denotes the transaction-
related fixed costs, (4) e denotes the cost associated with ownership exercising by diverse 
members, and (5) 0 denotes the adopted sharing rule. 
Different from the above treatments regarding a, and p, in this section I shall follow 
one common treatment in the literature of club goods mainly for the contrast purpose. While 
the details of modeling are different, the fundamentals are essentially identical. First of all, 
as the standard cost function of production, let a = a(X, n), and assume ax, an, axx. otnn > 0, 
where ax, an, and axx. otnn denote, respectively, the first and second degree of derivatives 
with respect to X and n. That is, the production cost is positively related to the 
capacity/quality of good X. and the maintenance cost is also positively related to the number 
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of members. Secondly, the congestion cost, p, is positively related to the number of 
members, and negatively to the quantity/capacity of good X. In notation, p = P(n, X), 
assuming pn, pnn  ^0, and Px, pxx < 0. Note that in some cases, such as flood-control dams, 
and high-culture broadcasting, there is no congestion cost, and thus p = 0. Once again, it is 
mainly for the purpose of comparison with the previous literature to assume a and p as 
functions of member size, instead of total utilization level of all members as in section 5.1. 
The transaction-related fixed cost, 5, includes such costs as of lawyer payment, 
registration, license, or even bribery for favorable regulatory treatments, and the like. Note 
that many transacting difficulties such as investment specificity, informational asymmetry, 
and so on, do not result in cost disadvantages for consumer-owned organizations, since the 
interests of both transacting sides are highly aligned under such an arrangement. 5 is 
assumed as unaffected by the amount of good X and the number of diverse members. 
However, the cost of collective ownership held by diverse consumers, E, frequently 
constitute the primary cost disadvantage for consumer-owned organization, especially in the 
context of public good problems. Customers could be so numerous, dispersed, transient, 
and diverse in interest that collective decision is difficult to make. Following Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962), the difficulty of collective decision-making is quantified as costs, which are 
measured as the sum of (1) expected loss from the sacrifice of the losing opposed and (2) 
resources involved in bargaining and negotiation for votes, under the cost-minimizing 
majority rule. The more diverse in interests, the higher the cost of collective decision­
making is expected to be. Hence, it is assumed that s = 8(n), and e', e" > 0. 
Finally, different sharing rules 0's generally incur different levels of enforcement 
costs. For example, the sharing rule based on benefit principle requires measurement on 
individual benefits, and conresponding pridng scheme. The rule of ability-to-pay also 
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demands information on members' wealth. On the other hand, equal sharing rule, if 
adopted, is relatively simple to enforce. Here the cost function is assumed to be discrete 
with respect to 0, for the reason that sharing rules are commonly different in kind in practice. 
To sum up, the cost function for the member-owned organization is denoted as 
C(X, n, ®) = C(a(X, n), p(n, X), 5, e(n), ©). 
On the demand side, suppose consumers have their preferences and values on 
sharing rules. That is, the consumer i's utility function is assumed as, V i, 
u'=u'(y', X, ®), ©e0. 
For example, the rule of equal sharing may not be preferable to those members who do not 
frequently use good X. The mle of ability-to-pay, likewise, might be distasteful to the less 
wealthy if invidious comparisons and resentments are generated. Here, Individual utility is 
also assumed to be discrete with respect to the sharing rule ® for the previous reason. 
Accordingly, when the provision level of good X, the member size, and the sharing 
rule are decided within the member-owned organization, the individual resource constraint is 
then 
y' + 0' C(X, n, ®) = r, V i, and ® e 0. 
Incorporating the resource constraint into the consumers' utility function, it can be obtained 
that v' = u'(l' - 0' C(X, n, ©), X, ®), V i. 
Assuming maximizing the group welfare as the goal for the member-owned 
organization with the financing of full cost-sharing, the organization faces the following 
problem: 
Max,x.n,e, W(v\ v  ^ v") = 
u'(r - e' C(a(X. n), P(n. X), 5, 8(n). ©), X, ©). 
67 
Since the group welfare function is differentiable with respect to X, and n, but discrete with 
respect to 0, solving the above maximizing problem may be divided into two steps. First, 
given certain sharing rule ®, V 0 6 0, the organization solves for X and n the following 
problem: 
Max,x.n, 1"=! u'(r - 0' C(a(X, n), p(n. X). 5, E(n), 0). X, 0). 
Assuming interior solutions, the associated first-order conditions are, with respect to X, 
[U x — U y-6 -(Ca'Clx + Cp'Px)] = 0| 
where u'x = 5uV5X, u'y s 5u'/9y', Ca = 8C/da, and Cp = 5C/sp. 
 ^Xi u X = (Co'ClX + Cp'Px) Si u'y*0' 
(Si u'x )/(Si 0' uV) = Ca-ax + Cp-Px (4), 
and, with respect to n, 
- Si U'y-[0''(Ca'an + Cp'Pn + CE'E') + 0'n*C] = 0, 
where CE = dC/de, and 0'n = 50'/5n. 
=> (Ca-an + Cp pn + Ce-eO-Si U'y0' = " C Si 
=> Ca'CIn + Cp'pn + CE'E' = C'[-(Si liy-OnVCSi U'y'6')] (5). 
The solutions, given sharing rule 0, are denoted as X® = X(l\ f,..., 1", 5; 0), and rf = n(r, 
1 ,^..., r, 5; 0), V © e 0. Plugging X® and n® into group welfare function to obtain W® = Si 
u'(l' - 0' C( X®, n®: 0), X®: 0). The level of W® stands for the welfare level given certain 
sharing rule 0. 
The second step is to solve for optimal sharing rule, denoted as 0**. Giving that W® 
is discrete with respect to 0, the optimal solution will be as follows: 
0** = argmax®6eW®. (6). 
Hence, under the organizational arrangement of the member-owned organization, the 
optimal provision level of good Xwill be X** = X(I\ l^  .... t, 5; 0**), the optimal membership 
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size will be n** = n(l\ P 1", 5; ©**), and the resulting welfare level will be W" = S, u'(r -
0' C(X", n**: ®**). X**: ®"). 
To interpret, note that equation (4) may be viewed as the provision condition. To 
maximize the group welfare, the marginal group welfare gained due to additional 
consumption of good X has to equal the forgone marginal welfare due to moving resource 
away from good y. On the left-hand side of equation (4), the numerator is the aggregate 
marginal values of good X for members, and the denominator is the aggregate marginal 
values of good y forgone by all members for producing an additional unit of good X. This 
ratio depicts how the organization as a whole will agree to substitute good y for X. Note that 
this "group marginal rate of substitution" is different from the famous summation of individual 
marginal rates of substitution, proposed by Samuelson (1954).^  
On the right-hand side of equation (4), the first part Ca-ax is the marginal cost for 
producing good X, and the second Cp px the marginal congestion cost expected to be saved 
due to the increased unit of X. Hence, the sum represents the true marginal cost of 
providing good X. Accordingly, equation (4) shows that the organization will choose the 
level of good X such that the "group marginal rate of substitution" equals the true marginal 
cost of good X. 
Equation (5) may be Interpreted as the membership condition. While admitting an 
additional member increases the costs of maintenance, congestion, and collective decision 
making, it may benefit all members by reducing their cost share and hence increasing their 
consumption of good y. More spedfically, the left-hand side of equation (5) is the marginal 
cost, caused by maintenance, congestion, and collective decision-making, for admitting an 
 ^In Samuelson's 1954 model, a common marginal rate of transformation (MRT) is assumed to exist, 
hence equating marginal utility of good y across consumers. In our model, there is no such an 
Identical rate. 
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additional member. On the right-hand side is the saved total cost adjusted by some welfare 
ratio. The numerator of the ratio is the aggregate marginal values of good y gained due to 
the possible reduction of individual cost share by admitting an additional member. The 
denominator is the aggregate marginal values of good y forgone due to the increased cost 
of collective decision-making shared among members. Therefore, equation (5) shows that 
the organization will choose the membership size such that the marginal welfare gained due 
to reduction of cost share by an additional member equals the marginal welfare lost due to 
the increased total costs associated with maintenance, congestion, and collective decision 
making. 
Equation (6) is the condition for optimal sharing rule. Since a sharing rule not only 
incurs enforcement cost, but also affect members' subjective feelings, the welfare-
maximizing sharing rule is not necessarily the one with lowest enforcement cost. For 
example, if individual consumption differs sharply among members, unless costs of 
enforcing the benefit-based rule outweigh the benefits it generates, the simple equal-sharing 
rule will not be prefen'ed. 
The above first two conditions are essentially parallel to those in the club-good model 
built by McGuire (1974). With the assumption of identical consumers, given equal sharing 
(denoted as 0e), 6' = l/n, V i, equation (4) and (5) become 
li MRS' (= n-MRS) = Ca-ax + CpPx (4a) 
and 
Ca'Otfl + Cp'Pn + CE'E' = C(X, n; ®e)/n (5a), 
respectively. If we allow consumer heterogeneity, retaining the rule of equal sharing, the 
provision condition then becomes 
[(Avg. MUx)/(Avg. MUy)] = (C  ^ax + Cp px)/n (4b) 
where 
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Avg. MUg = (I/n)Ii u'g, g = X, y, 
while the membership condition remains the same as (5a). Although different assumptions 
lead to different appearances of welfare maximizing conditions, the logic behind those 
conditions is the same: the marginal welfare gained equals the marginal welfare forgone. 
One difference in the membership condition is worth mention between the models of 
McGuire (1974) and this paper. In this model, good X can be perfectly nonrivalrous, as a 
flood-control dam for example, which bears no congestion for consumption. In notation, 
Cp Pn = 0. Different from McGuire's model, even if there is no possibility for congestion, the 
membership size still needs to be restricted here, due to the positive marginal cost of 
collective decision-making for admitting additional members. As equation (5a) shows, in the 
case of nonrivalrous good X, optimal number of members Is chosen so that marginal costs 
of maintenance (Ca-ax) and collective decision-making (Cc-e') equals average total costs per 
member. While the term "crowding" may not be appropriate for costly decision-making due 
to member diversity, it is instructive to compare the cost of collective decision-making with 
conventional congestion costs. 
5.3. Organizational Choice 
Without specific fonms of individual utility functions, general discussion in 
organizational choice is tremendously difficult, owing to the enomnous set of various 
contingencies. To simplify my modeling for organizational choice while retaining the primary 
themes of my theoretical analysis, I shall make several assumptions as follows. However, 
as mentioned at the beginning of chapter 5, the modeling in this section shall be regarded 
as my initial attempt in a longer-run project of a dynamic model for organizational formation 
and change. 
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First, I shall assume that n* > H and n** > H, where n*, n" are as defined in the 
previous two sections. In words, accordingly, either the profit-maximizing number of 
customers served by a for-profit finm, or the benefit-maximizing size of membership for a 
member-owned organization for providing good X, is no smaller than the total number of 
consumers, H. Hence, either organization will always prefer larger to smaller participation of 
consumers in this case of H consumers. 
Next, I shall assume that there exists a minimal customer base, denoted as n, for the 
for-profit firm producing good X such that, once the customer base is below, the for-profit 
firm will shut down and drop out of the market. Likewise, it is assumed that there is also a 
minimal membership size, denoted as n, for the member-owned organization such that, 
once the membership size is below, the member-owned organization will fail to survive. 
Also, it is assumed that n, n < H. Therefore, it is possible that, owing to insufficient market 
demands or supporting members, a for-profit firm or a member-owned organization fails to 
emerge for the provision of good X. 
There are three most immediate and simple scenarios as follows before going into 
the discussion of some other cases with relative complexity. First of all, the market of good 
X produced by a for-profit firm will take place if 
v''(ni) > v'^ Cnz), V i, and n, e [n , H], nz e [n , H] 
where ni denotes the number of customers for the for-profit producer-owned firm, nz 
denotes the number of members for the member-owned organization, V^CnO denotes the 
indirect utility function of consumer i under the organizational arrangement of good X 
provided by a producer-owned firm subjected to the constraint that the customer size n = ni, 
and v'**(n2) denotes the indirect utility function of member i consuming good X provided by a 
member-owned organization subjected to the constraint that the member size n = nz. That 
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is, if a market of good X produced by a for-profit firm, once existing, results in higher utility 
for all consumers, then such an arrangement will be chosen. Likewise, the member-owned 
organization will take place if 
v'*(ni) < V i. 
That is, if the provision of good X by a member-owned organization, once existing, results in 
higher utility for all consumers, then such a member-owned organization will emerge. 
Finally, it will not matter to the consumers which organizational an-angement is made if 
v''(ni) = v'"(n2), V i. 
Then the emergence of a feasible organizational anrangement becomes undetermined in our 
analysis. 
To further analyze some in-between scenarios in a simplified fashion, it is assumed 
that there are four groups of consumers among H with the different group sizes. The first 
group of consumers, denoted as set A, shares the following feature of their utility functions: 
v'*(ni) > v'( I', 0) > v'**(n2), V i e >\, i = 1, 2,..., n;,, 
and as previously assumed, ni e [n, H], n2 e [n , H]. This group of consumers can be 
regarded as those with the "stubborn" preference for the arrangement of a for-profit firm for 
providing good X, since they would prefer to no consumption of good X rather than good X 
provided by a member-owned organization. The second group of consumers, denoted as 
set 8, shares the following feature of their utility functions; 
v'*(ni) > V'^ Cna) > v'( I', 0), V i e B, i = 1,2,..., ns. 
Such group of consumers would prefer a for-profit firm to a member-owned organization for 
the provision of good X. Also, they always prefer some to no consumption of good X, no 
matter how good X is provided. The third group of consumers, denoted as C, shares the 
following feature of their utility functions: 
v^nz) > V^CnO > VC r, 0), V i e C, i = 1,2 nc-
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That is, this group of consumers would prefer a member-owned organization to a for-profit 
firm for the provision of good X. Also, they always prefer some to no consumption of good 
X, no matter how the good X is provided. Finally the last group of consumers, denoted as 
D, shares the following feature of their utility functions; 
v'"(n2) > v'( I', 0) > v'*(ni), V i e D, i = 1,2 no. 
The last group of consumers can be regarded as those with the "stubborn" preference for 
the provision of good X by a member-owned organization, since they would prefer to no 
consumption of good X rather than good X provided by a for-profit firm. Note also that n;, + 
na + nc + no = H. 
Finally, for analytical simplicity, I assume here that any of the above four groups finds 
it prohibitively costly to negotiate with one another for appropriate compensations for 
establishing a strategic coalition, so that no group would consider managing to establish a 
strategic coalition. Such a strategic coalition in my opinion merits more focused treatment, 
which is beyond the purpose of this dissertation. Consequently, four situations may be 
discussed as follows. 
(1) Case of n < n4 + ns, and n < nc + no: Consumer groups A and B would choose to 
buy good X from a for-profit fimri, while consumer groups C and D would choose to form a 
member-owned organization for the provision of good X. By assumption it is prohibitively 
costly to manage to forni a coalition (if at all possible) among different consumer groups. 
Hence, in the mari<et of good X, there would be n/« + ng customers of the for-profit firm, while 
the membership size would also be nc + no for the member-owned organization. 
(2) Case of n  ^+ ns < n, and n < nc + no; In this case, the minimal customer base 
required for the survival of a for-profit firm is greater than the total of consumer groups A and 
B. On the other hand, a member-owned organization appears promising since consumer 
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groups C and D constitute a sufficient size of membership for the establishment of a 
member-owned organization. Since it is prohibitively costly for groups A and B to manage 
to fonn a coalition (if at all possible) with group C for supporting the provision by a for-profit 
firm, consumer group 8 would instead choose to join the member-owned organization with 
consumer groups C and D. Hence, the member-owned organization would provide good X 
for consumers of groups A, B, and C as its members, while consumer group A would choose 
not to consume good X. 
(3) Case of n < n  ^+ ns, and nc + no < n: In this case, the minimal size of the 
membership required for the survival of a member-owned organization is greater than the 
total of group C and D. On the other hand, the potential market demands made up of 
consumer groups A and B are sufficient for the survival of a for-profit finm for producing good 
X. Similarly, given the infeasibility of forming a coalition among groups 8, C, and O for 
establishing the member-owned organization, consumer group C would then choose to buy 
good X in the market from the for-profit fimn. Hence, the for-profit firm would provide good X 
for consumers of groups A, 8, and C, while the remaining consumers of group 0 would 
choose not to consume good X. 
(4) Case of n/, + ns < n, and nc + no < n: Given the insufficient potential base of 
customers or members for either a for-profit firm or member-owned organization and the 
prohibitive cost of forming a necessary coalition among consumer groups, neither 
organizational arrangement would emerge and hence no good X would be provided. 
The primary theme of the above analysis is that consumers always seek a more 
satisfying arrangement for the purpose of their consumption, subject to various kinds of 
constraints. If they make some apparently less desirable choice, it is because they do not 
have better options. In the above analysis, negotiation cost of forming a coalition among 
diverse consumers and the minimal requirement of customer/member base for the survival 
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of a specific organization constitute Sonne important constraints to the organizational choice 
for the provision of good X. 
Moreover, in general it will be more/less possible for consumers to buy good X in the 
market when the true price p, including costs of searching and waiting, is relatively 
lower/higher than those costs associated with the member-owned organization for the 
provision. For instance, if market transaction at the market of good X is troubled by the 
monopolistic power so that the true price p is considerably high, we will then expect a 
relatively low indirect utility level for a consumer (v'*), which constitute a disadvantage for the 
emergence of the provision by a for-profit fimi. On the other hand, the cost of ownership 
exercising can be so enormous among some diverse members with intense interest conflicts 
that the resulting indirect utility level for a consumer-member (v'**) is too low to make such a 
member-owned organization ever desirable. Consistent with the argument by McGuire 
(1974) on group segregation that, given certain set of assumptions, class isolation is overall 
efficient, this dissertation maintains that an organization owned by members of less diversity 
incurs lower costs of collective decision-making and may be more likely to be established 
due to possible higher aggregate welfare. 
5.4. Organizational Alternatives Checking Transacting Problems 
Price exploitation by the finm against consumers can result from many kinds of 
maritet-transacting problems. Included can be such as monopolistic powers, the 
infonmational disadvantages of consumers, consumer lock-in" due to transaction specificity, 
and so on. When any of those problems prevails, the fimn may obtain positive profit even in 
the long run. However, price exploitation increases the true price which consumers pay for, 
providing strong motivation for consumers to seek alternative institutional arrangements. 
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When such alternatives are available, there will exist a check on the firm' exploiting its 
consumers. That is to say, even if there is only one firm In the market, it does not 
necessarily result in the monopolistic exploitation against customers. Availability of 
alternative Institutional choices provides such a check on the problems of market 
transacting. 
On the other hand, the firm may suffer from disadvantageous position during mari(et 
transacting as well. For example, problems resulting from investment specificity might be 
tremendously costly for the firm to prevent. As another example, the government agency 
might Impose excessive regulations on the rate of return to the franchised firm so that the 
firm might lose cost-minimizing incentives. Also, politicians or bureaucrats might extort 
benefits of different kinds from the firm by threatening unfavorable regulatory treatment. 
These may significantly increase the firm's total cost and raise the price level of good X, 
which affects the availability of the organizational fomi of investor-owned firms. 
To demonstrate, let n denotes the finm's profit. By definition, li prx' X = tt + C'. 
Assuming there is no distributional difficulty among consumers, consumers would choose 
the form of the investor-owned firm if 
liPrx'X+ IiPVx'X<C(X, n, ©) 
=> 7t + C' + Ij p'fx'X < C(X, n, ©) 
=>7t<C(X, n, ©)-C-lipVx-X (7). 
Equation (7) means that it is likely for the cost advantages of the investor-owned firm over 
the member-owned organization to serve as the upper bound of the firm's profit. Without 
cost advantages in production and exchange, the for-profit firm might cease to exist. 
Although the above is a static model, it retains some room for dynamic interpretation. 
More specifically, this model allows the possibility of incorporating interest groups' 
interactions. For example, it is possible that an incumbent firm in the mari<et of good X 
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would try to prevent the formation of a member-owned organization by lobbying legislation 
hindering new entrance. Such success may take the forms of legal prohibition, tax bias, and 
so on. These events may well be characterized by the raising of the total cost for a 
member-owned organization. For example, breaking laws is costly, requiring resources 
placed in bribery, preventing being caught, and the expected loss from legal punishment. 
Consequently, a member-owned organization becomes less likely to be established since 
higher transaction costs of such an institution lead to lower welfare level of resource use as 
shown by the negative relation between welfare and costs. 
5.5. Organization-Specific Benefit 
The above analysis emphasizes the role of transaction costs, such as those of 
collective decision-making, in detennining the appropriate institutional choice. In this 
section, the emphasis is changed. With slight modification, the Institution-specific benefits 
can be incorporated into the model. 
To demonstrate, suppose the organizational form of the member-owned organization 
generates additionally the satisfaction of members for participating in and goveming the 
organization with other people. In other word, membership itself is valuable to individuals. 
For example, attending meetings, assuming offices, and the like may be satisfying social 
activities themselves. Moreover, participating in the decision making of the organization 
may give members psychological satisfaction of being in control. It Is assumed here that 
consumer i's utility is 
U' = U'(y, X, ©, b), V i, and ©6 0, 
where b' = b'(X, n) represents the consumer i's extra benefit due to participating in the 
organization, which is assumed to be a function of provision level and membership size. For 
the purpose of explication, additive nature is assumed; that is, 
U'(y. X, ©, b) = u'(y, X. ©) + b'(X. n). 
V i, and 0 e O. Hence, du'/db > 0 by construction. It Is also assumed that such participation 
benefits increase, but at a decreasing rate, as the size of the organization grows in terms of 
provision scale and membership size; i.e., bV  ^Sb'/Sk > 0, and b'kk = 5^b'/(5k)^  < 0, V /c = X, n. 
To illustrate, being an owner of a relatively large organization is assumed here to make one 
feel esteemed and admired. 
Given the assumptions of the utilitarian society, and the financing of full cost-sharing, 
the member-owned organization attempts to maximize the group welfare; 
Max,x.n.®) W(v\v ,^..., v") => 
Max,x.n.®, li u'(r - 0' C(a(X, n), p(n. X), 5, E(n), ©), X. ©) + b'(X, n). 
This modification in the individual utility functions will lead to slightly different appearance of 
associated first order conditions as the following; 
Si [u'x + b'x - u'y-0'-(Caax + Cp-Px)] = 0 
=> Zt (u'x + b'x) = (Ca-Ctx + Cp Px)'Si liy-G' 
=> li (u'x + b'xVdi e'uV) = (C„ax + Cp-Px) (4'). 
and 
Si b'n - Si U'y*[0''(Ca'an + Cp'Pn + + 0'n'C] = 0 
=> (Ca'Otn + Cp'Pn + CE-6')*Si U'y-0' = Si b'n — C*Si U'y-0'n 
=> (C„ an + Cp-Pn + Ce-E') = (Si b'n - C-Si uV0'n)/(Si U  ^^ ) (5'). 
given sharing rule © € O. 
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Equation (4') differs from equation (4) only in the additional item I, b'x in the part of 
numerator on the left-hand side. Xj b'x denotes aggregate marginal psychological benefits 
due to increasing one more unit of good X through the member-owned organization. 
Therefore, welfare maximization requires that marginal aggregate welfare cost due to 
providing one more unit of good X needs to equal the marginal aggregate welfare benefit 
coming from both direct consumption and its psychological effect. Likewise, equation (5') 
shows the welfare-maximizing membership size will be so chosen that marginal aggregate 
welfare cost due to the increased cost of maintenance, congestion, and collective decision­
making equals marginal aggregate welfare benefit resulting from both decreased sharing 
burden and the psychological effect of increased membership size. 
With the assumption of identical individuals, given equal sharing rule 0' = 1/n V i, the 
first-order conditions, from (4') and (5'), become 
n-(MRSxy + MRSby-bx) = (Ca-ctx + Cp-Px) (4a'), 
and 
(Ca'Ctn + Cp'Pn + CE*8') = n-MRSby'bn + C/n (5a'). 
With diverse consumers and equal sharing, the provision condition becomes 
[Avg. MUx + bx (Avg. MUb)l/(Avg. MUy) = (C„ ax + Cp px)/n (4b'), 
while membership condition remains the same as equation (5a'). Again, the only difference 
in each new equation is the additional item of the associated psychological effects. 
Define A as the solution set under the arrangement of the member-owned 
organization in the absence of institution-specific benefit as the previous. That is, A = {X**, 
n**, ©•*}. Then given the existence of institution-specific benefit, we know 
5W/aX 1a = L [u'X + b'x - uVe' CCa-ax + Cp-Px)l 1A 
= Si b'x 1A > 0, 
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and 
5W/an IA = li b'n - L uV[e' (C„ a„ + Cp P„ + C. e') + GVC] I a 
= li b'n > 0. 
That is, the provision level X and membership size n with institution-specific benefit will be 
larger than those without. And aggregate welfare will be larger with the institution-specific 
benefit, which increases the possibility of being chosen relative to the case without. 
5.6. A Nonprofit Organization with Pure Donation Financing 
The above model may well extend to more than two organizational choices. To 
demonstrate, suppose there is a third arrangement, under which some consumers 
voluntarily donate certain amounts of their resource endowments to finance a nonprofit 
organization for the provision of good X. On the other hand, the nonprofit organization 
provides good X free of charge. This seemingly strange an-angement does have 
counterpart in the real worid, that is, listener-supported high-culture radio broadcasting. 
These radio stations provide free programs, completely financed by the donations of 
widespread listeners. 
To begin with, consider the total cost function associated with the nonprofit, denoted 
as C ,^ and it is specified as follows: 
C  ^= CV(X, n),P(X, n), 5  ^((>(X, n)) 
where a(X, n), P(X, n), and 5*  ^are defined, respectively, as the production and maintenance 
costs, congestion cost, and fixed transaction cost associated with the nonprofit organization, 
while (t>(X, n) denotes the agency cost associated with capital inflexibility due to absence of 
patron ownership and the reluctance of management to down-sizing when necessary. Due 
to the possibility of transferring or imitating advantageous production techniques, a(X. n). 
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and P(X, n) are assumed to be identical to those of other organizations. Transaction-related 
fixed cost 5*  ^ is assumed to be distinctive, due to such reasons as special legal status and 
regulatory treatment. 
The more characteristic cost element, denoted as (|>(X. n), may need further 
explanation. Without any owner, the nonprofit organization with independent management 
saves the enormous costs associated with the collective donor ownership. Managers and 
workers are hired on a fiduciary basis for the operation of the nonprofit. On the other hand, 
the absence of patron ownership generates the problem of capital immobility due to the 
following three factors. First, the capital sources of nonprofit organizations, such as debt, 
donations, and retained eamings if any, are generally less responsive to rapid increases in 
demand than equity capital. Secondly, when demand declines, a nonprofit organization has 
less incentive to reduce its investment than a for-profit firm, since the fomner requires only 
positive net rate of return to survive, instead of the equilibrium net rate of retum in the capital 
market. Moreover, the management of a nonprofit organization has a strong incentive to 
avoid downsizing, due to employment at stake and perhaps professional commitment, 
regardless of the net rate of retum on capital (Hansmann (1996, pp. 240-241)). Displacing 
the cost of collective decision-making by numerous owners, (|)(X, n) represents essentially 
one kind of agent costs. Here, it is assumed that <() is positively affected by provision level 
and operation scale, reflecting the downsizing inflexibility. 
For the nonprofit organization with pure donation financing, the resource constraint is 
then 
C^a(X, n), P(X, n), 8  ^ n)) < Ld', 
where d' denotes the amount of donation by the consumer i, and d' € [0, T], V i. For 
simplicity it is assumed that the equality holds hereafter. Since consumers' decisions are 
82 
our primary concern, the maximizing problem for the nonprofit organization is ignored here. 
Simply, let D = d' + D-i, where D.j = S,,, q'. Therefore, 
C^a(X. n), P(X, n). 5  ^(j»(X, n)) = d' + D.,, 
=>X = »F(d', D., n,5 )^HX  ^
assuming T( ) exists. That is, the provision level of good X by the nonprofit is a function of 
individual donations, consumer numbers, and some cost elements. Intuitively, the provision 
level is positively related to the amount of donations, and negatively to costs. 
It is beyond this paper to investigate whether some consumers make donations due 
to altruism, warm glow, derivation of other private benefits such as reputation, or any other 
consideration.^  ^ In this paper, following the basic feature of joint-product model by Comes 
and Sandler (1984), and "impure altruism" model by Andreoni (1990), individual i's utility 
function is assumed as 
u'=u'(y, d', X). Vi. 
An individual can derive satisfaction from consuming good y, and X, and also obtain benefit 
from his donation. That is, 5u'/5j > 0,5^u'/(ciy < 0, V j = y, d', X. 
The resource constraint for individual i is then 
y' + d' = r. 
Consequently, each individual can be viewed as solving the following maximizing problem 
for the amount of individual donation d; 
Max j^u'd'-d'^ dU"  ^ VI. 
Since donors may be so dispersed that mutual contact and influence is usually 
absent. Nash-behavlor is assumed for consumers' donation decision. Hence, the first-order 
conditions are 
See the survey article by Rose-Ackerman (1996) on the related literature. 
83 
d'[u'd + u'x-X'^d - u'y] =0, d' > 0, 
where u'd = 5u'/Sd, and X^d = 9X'^ /9d. For a donor-consumer, d' > 0, and u'd + u'x-X^d - u'y = 0. 
For a non-donor, d' = 0, and u'd + u'x-X'^ d - u'y < 0. Consequently, non-donors can free-ride 
on the contribution of donators if any level of good X is provided by the nonprofit 
organization. When voluntary contributions are viable, the tolerance for the above potential 
free-riding problem might suggest that difficulties associated with collective donor ownership 
be more severe. 
Once v'^  is obtained, the organizational emergence shall be analyzed as outlined in 
the section 5.3. Roughly speaking, a specific organizational arrangement might emerge if 
the total costs associated with both production and exchange are low enough so that higher 
value of resource uses could be realized. 
As long as the relevant benefits and costs are correctly ranked or measured, the 
organizational outcome is in principle predictable. As previously discussed, there are some 
cases in which producer-owned, customer-owned organizations are prohibitively costly. 
Traditional charities are a conspicuous example. 
While the logic behind the choice of contractual and organizational arrangements is 
simple, it will be challenging to rank or measure the total costs of production and exchange 
under different organizational alternatives. This task requires considerable understanding 
and knowledge about the nature and characteristics of costs incurring under different 
circumstances. Such understanding and knowledge must result from careful and 
comprehensive investigations on the real examples. 
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6. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
For the evaluation of my previous theoretical analysis, I shall investigate the pattem 
of dam ownership for empirical evidences. One main reason for choosing dam provision as 
the subject of this empirical study is the functional versatility of dams. As commonly known, 
dams may perform such functions as water supply, hydroelectric generation, flood control, 
recreation, and so on. Dams of distinctive functions constitute different types of public 
goods, the provision of which may encounter different sets of organizational difficulties. 
Such a likely variety of organizational difficulties could bring about the advantage of 
facilitating my evaluation in a broader fashion. 
This empirical study is organized as follows; first, the characteristics and adjustment 
of the data used in this study will be introduced and described in some details. Next, ten 
general hypotheses will be proposed for three distinctive kinds of dams' ownership 
anrangement, based on the theoretical underpinnings of chapter 4 and 5. Thirdly, the 
empirical evidences will be presented, followed by the main conclusions of this study in the 
last section. 
6.1. Data Description and Adjustment 
The data source is the National inventory of Dams (NID), updated during 1998 and 
1999 and available on the U.S. Amny Corps of Engineers' web page.^  The 1998-99 NID 
data contains such information as dam name, location, nearby city, owner name, ownership 
type, dam designer, dam type, dam purposes, year completed and modified, height. 
 ^See NID web site http://crunch.tec.army.mil/nid/webpages/nid.html. 
85 
storage, surface and drainage area, source agency, and so on?  ^ Among tiiese infomnation 
fields, the ownership type is especially relevant in this empirical study, serving as the 
evidence for evaluating my theoretical analysis in the organizational patterns of public good 
provision. 
There are eleven purposes of dams identified in 1998-99 NID as follows; im'gation 
(coded as I), hydroelectricity (H), flood control (C), navigation (N), water supply (S), 
recreation (R), fire protection, stock, or small farm pond (P), fish and wildlife pond (F), debris 
control (D), tailings (T), and other (O). In the NID data, codes are concatenated if the dam 
has multiple purposes, with the order indicating the relative decreasing importance of the 
purposes. For example, SCR would mean that the dam is primarily for water supply, then 
for flood control, and last for recreation. 
Evidently, among the eleven primary dam purposes, not all are public. For example, 
fire protection or farm ponds, debris control, and tailings for mining companies are highly 
private in nature. Since NID data does not distinguish private from public purposes, similar 
concerns, though of different degrees, also apply to the data of irrigation, water supply, 
hydroelectricity, and recreation dams, which may serve only individuals or individual 
businesses in many cases. Hence, the data in these categories may provide misleading 
evidences for the study of public good provision, the focus of this empirical study. To 
maintain a high degree of data relevance, those dams will be excluded from this study. 
Therefore, my empirical study is confined to dams with the primary purpose falling into the 
following categories: (1) navigation, (2) fish and wildlife conservation, and (3) flood control, 
all of which are highly public in nature. 
The 1998-99 NID data divides all dams by ownership type into five main categories, 
including that of federal, state, local government, public utility, and private. Besides the five 
 ^The detailed data dictionary is provided in the Appendix. 
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categories, there are also a small amount of dams with neither owner nor ownership type 
Information. Among the five categories, public utility requires further rearrangement, since it 
contains primarily utilities and special districts, defined as one form of local governments by 
the government census In the United States. For the purpose of my study, this category will 
be broken into the category of federal, state, local govemment, or private, whenever 
appropriate. 
Owing to the presence of easement^ there might be considerable confusion in the 
ownership classification of the NID data. An easement has been defined as a right, 
privilege, or liberty that one has in land owned by another; it is a right to a limited use in 
another's land for some special and definite purpose. In the case of dam provision, a 
flowage easement is the right that a person, or a group of persons, has to flood water on the 
land of another/others. It is observed that confusion of ownership classification occurs In the 
case of dams provided through easements held by governments on private lands. Some 
states classify such dams as private in NID data, while others as public. Report errors In 
this regard further complicate the situation. This classification confusion is expected to be 
considerable in the case of flood-control dams, many of which have been built under PL566 
(Public Law 83-566), the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Acts of 1954, later 
amended In 1956 and 1965.**  ^ To avoid the above problem, the data of flood-control dams 
used here will be limited to some states where correction is manageable. 
Moreover, I will reclassify those dams with the easement held by governments into 
the govemment ownership, as long as the easement is legally transferable. Dam facilities 
assodated with a transferable easement held by the govemment may be regarded as 
owned in fee simple by the govemment, since the govemment could transfer the easement 
*° Easement Is the term used in the common law, while sen/Hude is the equivalent in the civil law. 
Under PL566 state or local governments share the burden of local flood-control works by providing 
lands, easements, and rights-of-way, while the federal govemment bears the entire construction cost. 
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to another qualified entity, such as another governmental unit, a nonprofit, or even a for-
profit finn. In other words, a transferable easement in essence separates dam facilities from 
the ownership of land. 
6.2. Proposed Hypotheses 
6.2.1. Locks/dams for navigation 
Inland waterways can be classified into three types: natural rivers, canalized rivers, 
and artificial canals. On canalized rivers, navigation is facilitated by locks, which create a 
series of steps for passing vessels. In the case of artificial canals, in addition to locks, 
storage reservoirs must be provided to feed the summit pound with enough water. Also, 
other reservoirs can be introduced at lower levels to meet heavier traffic movements 
entailing more frequent lockage operation. Therefore, locks and certain dams are primarily 
for the purpose of navigation. 
In the United States, before the birth of rail, automobile, and air transport, water 
transport served as the most crucial means that has been historically credited for the 
opening up of the (westem) interior in eariy nineteenth century.''^  However, the importance 
of inland water transport declined with the development of rail transport, which soon attained 
its dominance until the am'val of the motor age. Among the few exceptions, St. Lawrence 
Seaway and the New Yoric State Barge Canal may be two conspicuous examples. Since 
some bulk commodities face less stringent time constraint in transportation, they may still 
find inland waterways an economical means. Such commodities include coal, petroleum, 
ore, grains, primary manufactured goods (e.g., paper, concrete, metals, wood products), 
It was said in 1812 that a good team of five or six horses would take 18 to 35 days to carry one to 
one and a half tons of goods between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. See Hadfield (1981, p.192). 
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and so on. According to 1998-99 NID, there are 250 dams primary for navigation purpose, 
amounting to only 0.33% of the total dams (76,919 in number) in the United States. 
With relative ease in use exclusion, the provision of locks and dams on canalized 
rivers or artificial canals nonetheless incurs enormous sunk costs, which are not recoverable 
once the transaction fails to continue aftenwards. Moreover, navigation facilities generally 
require integral plans covering vast areas. The granting of legal monopolistic status seems 
inevitable. Due to the transaction difficulties of investment specificity and monopolistic 
power, producer ownership with little direct regulations will not be economically feasible in 
my analysis. Such direct regulations include the granting of provision contracts or licenses 
via the delegated authority, rate or rate of retum regulation, and the like. Therefore, my first 
hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
Hypothesis 1; In the case of navigation dams/locks, for-profrt producer ownership 
with providing navigation facilities as the main line of business will be difficult to maintain 
without the aid of direct regulations. 
With direct regulations aiming at solving the transaction difficulties, producer 
ownership tums theoretically feasible. Such feasibility has to, however, rely on appropriate 
regulatory regimes, favorable technological and market conditions. Take as an example the 
pioneer canals provision in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Private 
watenway companies were constrained by engineering technology and legal inability to 
prevent toll evasion so that dim profitability led to lack of financial resources (Hadfield (1981, 
chapter 14), Shaw (1990, chapter 1)). The development and competition of rail transport 
further worsened the business of private canal companies. Eventually ail private companies 
failed to survive. In theory, nonetheless, with appropriate regulations, the ownership held by 
for-profit firms with providing navigation facilities as the main line of business is economically 
feasible as long as technological, finandal and other market factors are favorable. 
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Should exclusion be highly difficult in some special cases, it is theoretically possible 
to circumvent the non-excludablllty difficulty if navigation service can be tied within the sale 
of other goods/services free from the exclusion difficulty. For example, if a dam serves not 
only for navigation, but also for water supply for a local area, then navigation facilities can be 
tied within the transaction of water utilities, consumed approximately by the identical group 
of local interests. One implication is that, through tie-in transactions, the provision of 
navigation dams does not require "direcf govemment regulations on navigation matters. 
Since there is no explicit transaction of navigation facilities, necessary regulation would 
result mainly from the purpose of facilitating the transaction of other goods/services. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
Hypothesis 2: In the case of navigation damsAocks, for-profit producer ownership 
without the aid of direction regulations may be maintained only if the service of navigation 
facilities can be tied within the transactions of other goods/services. 
Altematively, provision via an organization collectively owned/controlled by the 
involved interests of water transport is another possibility - the exploitative incentives 
associated with the problems of Investment specificity and monopolistic power are 
eliminated under such an organizational arrangement. In the United States, the navigation 
networks commonly covers vast areas, frequently more than one local or state jurisdiction. 
Examples Include the network of St. Lawrence River and Great Lakes, that of Hudson River 
and Great Lakes, that of Mississippi River and Great Lakes, and so on. Such navigation 
facilities require integral planning and coordinating different local interests, the scopes of 
which will be far beyond local community associations. Attempts to establish a private 
organization matching such huge scopes Is redundant since the existing govemment 
performs the similar function. Accordingly, govemment ownership, especially by federal 
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government, is arguably common in the United States. Therefore, the following hypothesis 
is proposed: 
Hypothesis 3; In the case of navigation dams/locks, government ownership will be 
a feasible organizational choice. In the United States, government ownership will generally 
involve federal government, unless (1) the navigation benefit is highly limited within a local 
or state jurisdiction, or (2) the interest of a local or state government has been long 
established and thus politically influential. 
Construction of navigation networks alone requires enormous financial resource, 
which makes it highly difficult to rely on voluntary donations. Hence, the provision of 
locks/dams by donation-financing nonprofit organizations is arguably rare if at all viable. 
6.2.2. Dams for fish-wildlife conservation 
Among the means of protecting or restoring wetlands as fish and wildlife habitats are 
such as plugging drainage ditches, breaking tile drainage systems, installing water control 
structures, re-establishing old connections with waterways, constructing off-stream livestock 
watering facilities, and the like. Dams built for those ends are classified as dams for fish and 
wildlife conservation. Dams of this sort are usually very small in size. In the United States, 
there are 1,016 dams primary for this purpose, accounting to 1.32% of the total of all dams 
in 1998-99 NID. 
There exist evident transaction difficulties in the provision of conservation services by 
for-profit producer-owned firms. First, non-excludability difficulty is tremendous in this case, 
since no traceable consumption activities take place for identifying beneficiaries, so that 
benefidaries can easily avoid paying for the conservation services. On the other hand, even 
if all beneficiaries would pay honestly for the conservation services, they would, in turn, 
encounter tremendous informational disadvantages in knowing whether their payments 
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result In any (reasonable) marginal increment to the services, occum'ng mostly in remote 
areas. For-profit firms can easily exploit their paying customers. 
In theory, exclusion difficulty could be resolved if the sen/ice offish-wildlife 
conservation can be tied within the sale of other goods/sen/ices with no exclusion difficulty. 
In the United States, fish-wildlife conservation generally takes place in remote areas, in 
which there may be such businesses as ranches, timber production, and so on. The 
addition of consen/ation facilities might create or enhance the recreational values of those 
businesses in the forms of sport fishing/hunting, wildlife viewing, and the like. Therefore, it 
is possible for fish-wildlife conservation to be tied within the transaction of recreational 
goods/services. This possibility of "tie-in" transaction immediately implies that the owners of 
fish-wildlife conservation dams may include farms or ranches, range-land owners, and the 
like, who engage in recreational business related to fish and wildlife besides their primary 
lines of businesses, so that the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 4.a: In the case of fish-wildlife conservation dams, for-profit producer 
ownership may be maintained only if conservation service can be tied within the 
transactions of other goods/sen/ices. 
When tie-in transaction is not feasible, the technical difficulties of consumer 
identification and exclusion prevent the emergence of for-profit producer-owned firms 
engaging in fish-wildlife conservation. Hence, the above hypothesis can be alternatively 
expressed as follows: 
Hypothesis 4.b; In the case offish-wildlife conservation dams, for-profit producer 
ownership with fish-wildlife consen/ation as the primary line of business will be different to 
maintain. 
Note that there is no conceivable regulatory scheme that can resolve the non-
excludability problem in this case. In contrast to the case of navigation dams/locks, 
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therefore, the provision of fish-wildlife conservation cannot be nriade feasible by 
governmental regulations. On the other hand, given the typically small scale of such 
conservation facilities, voluntary contribution/donation is a possible way of financing. 
Moreover, with the "non-distribution" constraint of net eamings, nonprofit organizations also 
provide the safeguard against the exploitative incentives resulting from the customers' 
informational disadvantages. Accordingly, the conservation provision is theoretically 
feasible by voluntary individuals or proprietors with lines of businesses unrelated to fish-
wildlife conservation, or nonprofit organizations. The following hypothesis can be proposed; 
Hypothesis 5; In the case offish-wildlife conservation dams, it is possible for the 
ownership to be held by (1) voluntary individuals, or proprietors in lines of business 
unrelated to fish-wildlife conservation, or by (2) nonprofit organizations (controlled by an 
autonomous board of directors/trustees). 
Altematively, organizations under customer ownership constitute another 
organizational possibility, as long as the majority of involved interests support such 
organizational arrangements. Some sets of formal or infonmal rules could be established 
through the process of collective decision-making among the involved interests to resolve 
the non-excludability problem. Different ranges of involvement result in such a variety of 
organizational forms as community associations and govemments. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis can be proposed; 
Hypothesis 6; In the case offish-wildlife conservation dams, it is possible for the 
ownership to be held by customer-owned/controlled organizations, such as community 
associations and govemments. 
In the case of private customer-owned organizations such as landowners or 
community assodations, my theory argues that such organizations must rely on favorable 
conditions for collective ownership. That is, the feasibility of such organizations rests on the 
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homogeneity of members' interests or subjective values, precluding the possibility of intense 
interest conflicts. With small communities or rural areas serving as the proxy of interest 
homogeneity, the following hypothesis is thus proposed; 
Hypothesis 7; In the case offish-wildlife conservation dams, the ownership held by 
such member-owned organizations as landowner associations will be mostly found in small 
communities or rural areas, but not vice versa. 
6.2.3. Dams for flood control 
Besides channel improvement, levees, and floodways, dams have long been another 
familiar way of flood control, providing temporary artificial storage of excess floodwaters for 
subsequent release at a rate within the capacity of the stream channel. According to 1998-
99 NID, dams primary for flood control ranks the third in number (12,023), next to recreation 
dams and fire or farm ponds in the United States. It also means that among a hundred 
dams in the United States, about 15 or 16 dams are primarily for the purpose of flood 
control. 
It is highly difficult for a private provider to directly exclude people from the non-
rivalrous benefit generated by a flood-control dam once built. However, this exclusion 
difficulty could be circumvented if the service of flood control can be tied within the sale of 
other goods/services free from difficulties of use exclusion. In the case of flood-control 
dams, two possibilities are gemiane: the first involves a tie with the sale or rental of lands; 
flood-control dams largely enhance, or in some cases create, the residential or commercial 
values of nearby lands. The second is tied to the sale of the dam's other joint products, 
such as water utilities, which are free from exclusion difficulty and consumed by 
approximately the same group of customers. Dams with multiple purposes may provide 
such possibility. 
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In contrast, navigation service generally does not need to be tied within the 
transaction of other goods/services; exclusion of navigation benefit is relatively easy. Fish-
wildlife conservation, on the other hand, generally takes place in remote areas, the 
residential value of which can hardly be generated by the addition of conservation facilities. 
Moreover, dams for fish-wildlife conservation usually do not allow for other purposes than 
recreation for making profit. 
Two immediate implications are conceivable with those possibilities of "tie-in" 
transaction. First, the possible owners of flood-control dams may include those businesses 
Involved in land development, real estate, water utilities, and the like. Another implication is, 
through tie-in transactions, the provision of flood-control dams does not require "direct" 
govemment regulations on flood control. Since there is no explicit transaction of flood-
control service, necessary regulation would result mainly from the purpose of facilitating the 
transaction of other goods/services. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
Hypothesis 8.a; In the case of flood-control dams, for-profit producer ownership 
may be maintained only if flood-control sen/ice can be tied within the transactions of other 
goods or services. 
Likewise, without the possibility of tie-in transactions, non-excludability and other 
transaction difficulties such as investment specificity prohibit the producer ownership. That 
is, the above hypothesis can be expressed altematively as follows: 
Hypothesis 8.b: In the case of flood-control dams, for-profit producer ownership 
with flood-control as the only line of business will be different to maintain. 
Notably, there is no conceivable regulation or legislation that can resolve the non-
excludability problem without displadng private contracting between producer-owned fimns 
and their customers. Mandatory payment by law to the dam's provider, for instance, is 
essentially equivalent of taxation, eliminating the very nature of private/market transacting. 
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According to my theory, customer-owned/controlled organizations are another 
possible fonm of organizational arrangements; through the collective decision-making 
process, some formal or informal rules could be established among the involved interests to 
resolve the non-excludability problem. Moreover, such organizational anrangements could 
also avoid many transactional difficulties, since the interests of both transacting sides are 
highly aligned if not identical. With no opportunity of tie-in transactions, government 
ownership is predicted as the dominant organizational form if the threat of floods affects the 
voting majority of at least one governmental jurisdiction. Flood-control provision is usually 
easy to obtain wide support from the majority of local interests threatened by floods; it Is not 
necessary to rely on other private associations or nonprofit organizations. 
If, on the other hand, floods threaten only a small portion of the population within a 
governmental jurisdiction, government provision might fail to obtain enough support in the 
political process. With the favorable condition of interest homogeneity, community/property-
owners associations may emerge for the provision of flood-control dams. The condition of 
interest homogeneity is usually favorable in small or rural communities, which may hence 
serve as the conresponding proxy variable. Owing to the urgency of possible life and/or 
property losses, mere reliance on donation-financing nonprofits should be rare. Insurance 
or moving away is more likely under this kind of circumstances. 
In conclusion, some hypotheses could be proposed as follows; 
Hypothesis 9: In the case of flood-control dams without the tie-in transaction 
opportunities, it is possible for the ownership to be held by customer-owned/controlled 
organizations, such as community/property-owners associations and governments. 
Hypothesis 10: In the case of flood-control dams without the tie-in transaction 
opportunities, the ownership held by such member-owned organizations as 
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community/property-owners associations will take place mostly in flood-threatened small 
communities or rural areas, but not vice versa. 
6.3. Empirical Evidences 
6.3.1. Locks/dams for navigation 
To reject hypothesis 1, it is necessary to show the presence of unregulated for-profit 
producer ownership with providing navigation facilities as the nnain line of business. 
According to the corrected 1998-99 NID data, the ownership distribution of the navigation 
dams in the United States is shown in figure 6.1. 
Among 250 navigation dams, there are only two dams recorded as owned by private 
fimns. Dayton dam, owned by "Midwest Hydro, Inc.," is located on Fox River in La Salle 
Local Gov. Private 
5(2%) ~ 2(1%) 
State 
56 (22%) 
Federal 
187(75%) 
Figure 6.1. Ownership distribution of navigational dams and locks (1998-99 NID) 
97 
County of Illinois. The other, Town River Pond Dam, owned by a fimn named "A.P.C. Corp.," 
is located in Plymouth County in Massachusetts. However. Dayton dam tums out to be a 
case of reporting error in the NiD data. Midwest Hydro, Inc., located in Neshkoro, 
Wisconsin, is a hydroelectric company. Dayton dam is under the management of Midwest 
Hydro's Illinois agent. North American Hydro, Inc. in Winnetak, for the purpose of 
hydroelectric generation. As a data file of such grand scale, the 1998-99 NID inevitably 
contains certain level of reporting enrors. 
Further information about the owner of Town River Pond Dam is necessary to 
evaluate hypothesis 1. If A.P.C. Corp. does engage in providing navigation facilities as its 
main line of business without the aid of such regulations as of price or rate of return, then 
hypothesis 1 will become dubious. Contrarily, misreporting will be regarded as supporting 
evidence for hypothesis 1, while the presence of tie-in transaction will support hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 consists of two parts. The first is the feasibility of the govemment 
ownership. This part is confinmed by the presence of such an organizational an-angement, 
as shown in figure 6.1. In 1998-99 NID, there are 248 navigation dams owned by either the 
federal, state, or local govemment, accounting to 99.2% of the total dams primarily for 
navigation. 
The second part of hypothesis 3 maintains that the federal ownership would be 
largely related to the interstate nature of navigational service that the facilities bring about, 
unless the political influence of state or local interests upsets this pattern. One way of 
evaluating this portion of hypothesis is to conduct the contingency table analysis, aided with 
some measure of association between the interstate coverage of navigation service and the 
pattern of govemmental ownership. 
Table 6.1 presents the result of classifying the navigation dams/locks in 1998-99 NID 
into two types, interstate and instate, based on the navigational coverage of the involved 
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Table 6.1. Rivers with navigational dams/locks and their navigational coverage 
State River Interstate Justification 
AL Alabama River 1 System of Alabama River and its upstream 
Coosa River provides navigation benefit 
covering Alabama and Georgia. 
Black Wanior River 1/0 Connecting Tombigbee River makes it 
navigable to at least Tennessee River 
system. 
Chattahoochee River 1 Navigable Chattahoochee River involves 
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. 
Tennessee River 1 In addition to connecting Ohio River 
system, navigation benefit covers at least 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama. 
Tombigbee River 1 Tombigbee River itself covers Alabama 
and Mississippi; with Tenessee-
Tombigbee Waterway, It connects 
additionally Tennessee River system. 
AR Arkansas River 1 Interstate (AR, OK, KS, etc.) 
Ouachita River 1 Interstate (AR, LA) 
FL Apalachicola River 1 Apalachicola/Chattahoochee River 
involves Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. 
See AL. 
Caloosahatchee 
River 
0 South Florida 
Oklawaha River 0 Northeastern Florida; principal tributary of 
St. Johns River 
Palatklakaha Creek 0 Central Florida 
St. Johns River 
(Offstream) 
0 Northeastern Florida 
St. Lucie Canal 0 South Florida 
Withlacoochee River 0 Central Florida 
GA Savannah River 1 Bordering Georgia and South Carolina 
lA Mississippi River 1 Interstate (MN, Wl, lA, IL, MO. KY, TN, 
AR, MS. LA) 
IL Calumet River 1 Interstate (IL, IN) 
Chicago Sanitary & 
Ship Canal 
1 Connecting systems of Great Lakes and 
Mississippi River 
Des Plaines River 1 Connecting systems of Great Lakes and 
Mississippi River 
Fox River 0 A tributary of Illinois River 
Illinois River 1 Connecting systems of Great Lakes and 
Mississippi River 
Kaskaskia River 1 A tributary in South Illinois of Mississippi 
River 
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
State River Interstate Justification 
IL Mississippi River 1 See lA. 
Ohio River 1 Interstate (IL. KY, IN. OH. WV. PA, etc.) 
KY Barren River 1/0 A tributary of Green Riven part of Ohio 
River system 
Green River 1 Part of Ohio River system 
Kentucky River 1 Part of Ohio River system 
Ohio River 1 See IL. 
Tennessee River 1 See AL. 
LA Black River 1 Black/Ouachita River covers Louisiana, 
and Ari<ansas. 
Ouachita River 1 Black/Ouachita River covers Louisiana, 
and Ari<ansas. 
Pearl River 1 Interstate (MS, LA) 
Pearl River Canal 1 Interstate (MS, LA) 
Red River 1 Interstate (LA, AR, TX, OK, etc.) 
MA Charles River 0 Instate 
Mystic River 0 A tributary of Charies River 
Town River 0 Instate 
ME Songo River 0 Instate 
IVII St. Marys River 1 Connecting Lake Superior and Lake 
Huron; bordering the U.S. and Canada 
MN Mississippi River 1 See lA. 
Muskrat Lake 0 Instate 
MO Mississippi River 1 See lA. 
MS Tombigbee River 1 Interstate; see AL. 
NC Cape Fear River 1/0 Part of Atlantic Intracoastal waterway 
NY Black River 0 Instate 
Butternut Creek 0 Instate 
Champlain Canal 0 Connecting Hudson River, and lower St. 
Lawrance River valleys 
Chittenango Creek 0 Instate 
Clyde River 0 Instate 
Eaton Brook 0 Instate 
Erie Canal 1 Part of New York State Barge Canal; 
connecting systems of Hudson River and 
Great Lakes 
Genesee River 0 Instate 
Grindstone Creek 0 Instate 
Hudson River 1/0 Connecting Great-Lake system by New 
York State Barge Canal 
Limestone Creek 0 Instate 
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
State River Interstate Justification 
NY Mohawk River 1 Part of New York State Barge Canal 
New York State 
Barge Canal 
1 Connecting systems of Hudson River and 
Great Lakes 
North Lake Outlet 0 Instate 
Oneida River 0 Instate 
Oswego River 0 Instate 
Payne Brook 0 Instate 
Seneca River/Canal 0 Instate 
Sand Lake 0 Instate 
Sandy Creek 0 Instate 
OH Ohio River 1 See IL. 
OK Arkansas River 1 See AR. 
Verdigris River 1 Covering Kansas and Oklahoma; part of 
Arkansas River system 
OR Columbia River 1 Interstate (WA, OR, etc.) 
PA Allegheny River 1 Covering New York and Pennsylvania; 
part of Ohio River system 
Monongahela River 1 Covering West Virginia and Pennsylvania; 
part of Ohio River system 
Ohio River 1 See IL. 
TN Clinch River 1/0 A tributary of Tennessee River; part of 
Tennessee River system 
Tennessee River 1 See AL. 
Watauga River 1/0 A tributary of Tennessee Riven part of 
Tennessee River system 
WA Lake Washington 
Ship Canal 
0 Instate 
Snake River 1 Interstate (ID, OR, WA, etc.) 
Wl Fox River 1 Connecting Lake Michigan and Wisconsin 
River, a tributary of Mississippi River 
Mississippi River 1 See lA. 
WV Kanawha River 1 A tributary of Ohio Riven part of Ohio 
River system 
Monongahela River 1 Interstate; see PA. 
Ohio River 1 See IL. 
Tygart River 1 Upstream of Monongahela River; part of 
Ohio River system 
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rivers. Among the 24 states with navigational dams/locks in the first column, there are 82 
rivers and canals involved with the 248 government-owned locks/dams, as shown in the 
second column. The third column provides the coding of the interstate nature of navigable 
rivers and canals, with 1 representing interstate and 0 othenivise. Justifications for my 
grouping are provided in the last column. Note that in my classification there are 5 "in-
between" cases, denoted as 1/0, including Black Warrior River In Alabama, Ban-en River in 
Kentucky, Cape Fear River in North Carolina. Clinch River and Watauga River in 
Tennessee. These 5 in-between cases therefore do not provide organizational contradiction 
against my hypothesis. Such consideration will be incorporated in constructing the 
contingency table. 
The contingency table for evaluating the second portion of hypothesis 4 is presented 
as follows. In table 6.2, regardless of the navigational coverage variable, total federal 
ownership is 75.4%. In the case of interstate navigation coverage, the percentage of federal 
ownership is 86.8 (184 out of 212), while instate only 8.3 (3 out of 36). Evident diagonal 
concentration seems to suggest the hypothetical relationship between interstate coverage 
and federal ownership. 
The conventional test in the contingency table analysis is by means of the chi-square 
statistic for the independence between column and row variables. The calculated value of 
chi-square statistic for this table is 102.142, far greater than the critical value 6.635, allowing 
Table 6.2. Relationship between interstate coverage and govemment ownership 
Navigational Coverage 
Ownership Pattern Interstate Instate Total 
Federal 86.8% 8.3% 75.4% 
Non-Federal 13.2% 91.7% 24.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(n = 212) (n = 36) (n = 248) 
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a 1 % chance of error, given the degree of freedom 1. Therefore, it can be infen'ed that a 
relationship exists between navigational coverage and the pattem of governmental 
ownership. 
To assess the strength of the association between column and row variables, the 
most frequently used measure of association, Cremer's V, is chosen here. Based on the 
chi-square statistic, the formula of Cremer's V, denoted as V, is given as follows: 
V = square root of [chi-square/(m n)] 
where chi-square = value of chi-square statistic calculed for the contingency table, m = 
min[(number of rows in the table -1), (number of columns in the table -1)], and n denotes 
the sample size. The measure ranges from 0, indicating no relationship, to 1, a perfect 
relationship between the variables. For table 6.2, the Cremer's V is 0.64, indicating a 
perceivable, though perhaps mild, relationship between navigational coverage and the 
pattem of govemmental ownership. 
Evaluating hypothesis 3 would become more thorough once we take into account the 
long established state interests, well documented in history, of New York government in the 
development of inland waterway system since the unique success of Erie Canal. New York 
State has had the most extensive inland watenway system in the United States, since the 
completion of New York State Barge Canal System in 1918. Among the 49 navigational 
dams/locks in 1998-99 NID data, 47 are owned by the state government, one city-owned, 
and one federal-owned. However, there are 26 dams/locks associated with those rivers and 
canals that are highly interstate in temis of their navigational impacts. Hypothesis 3 
suggests that the relationship between interstate coverage and federal ownership should 
become more evident once the influential state or local interests are ruled out. 
Singling out the data of New Yoric State, I derive a new contingency table as follows. 
In table 6.3, the percentage of total federal ownership rises from 75.4 to 93.5, whereas the 
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Table 6.3. Relationship between interstate coverage and govemnnent ownership 
(Without New York State data) 
Navigational Coverage 
Ownership Pattern Interstate Instate Total 
Federal 98.4% 23.1% 93.5% 
Non-Federal 1.6% 76.9% 6.5% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(n = 186) C
O II (n = 199) 
federal ownership in the category of interstate coverage also nses dramatically from 86.8 to 
98.4. This suggests that the dam ownership held by New York State obscures to some 
extent the relationship of federal ownership with interstate navigation in the NID data. On 
the other hand, in the category of instate coverage, the percentage of federal ownership 
also rises from 8.3 to 23.1 when New York State is excluded. It appears that the federal 
govemment has been more involved in instate navigation than shown in table 6.2, which 
could suggest the possibility of the long criticized federal over-involvement, resulting from 
so-called "pork-ban'el politics." 
The calculated chi-square statistic for this new table is 112.865, rejecting once again 
the hypothetical independence between navigational coverage and ownership pattern at the 
significant level of 1%. The measure of association, Cremer's V, now increases to 0.75, 
Indicating a much more apparent relationship between federal ownership and interstate 
navigation, when New York State is excluded. Higher Cremer's V makes doubtful the 
criticism of the federal over-involvement. First, the total number of instate navigation 
coverage is so greatly reduced that even one additional case of the federal involvement in 
instate navigation will dramatically increase its share in percentage, as shown in the new 
contingency table. Moreover, the total number of non-federal ownership is now so low that it 
becomes especially dramatic to have 76.9% (10 out of 13) of instate navigation facilities 
under non-federal ownership. Hence, 23.1% (3 out of 13) of federal involvement in instate 
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navigation alone is not convincing evidence to endorse the criticism of the federal over-
involvement. 
In summary, the above contingency table analysis supports (or fails to reject) 
hypothesis 3. On the one hand, the federal ownership is largely related to the interstate 
coverage of navigational facilities, while, on the other, this relationship is more evident once 
the influence of established state/local interests is reduced. 
6.3.2. Dams for fish-wildlife conservation 
Logically it will be sufficient for rejecting hypothesis 4.a and 4.b to show the presence 
of for-profit producer ownership with fish-wildlife conservation as the main line of business. 
Partial confinnation of hypothesis 4 will result if there is no conflicting case in 1998-99 NID 
data. 
The distribution of ownership types is shown in figure 6.2, which provides a pie chart 
for the ownership distribution of dams for fish-wildlife consen/ation. In figure 6.2, the 
government ownership, including federal, state, and local govemments, accounts for 396 
cases or about 39 in percentage, while the private ownership accounts for 309 cases or 
about 30.4 in percentage. There are also 311 dams without the specification of ownership 
type. 
Although the 1998-99 NID data does not contain the information about the lines of 
businesses in which owners are engaged, some names of the private dam owners evidently 
indicate the associated lines of businesses. For example, the main business line of Ragley 
Lumber Company or Intemational Paper Company is self-evident. Among those owners 
with lines of businesses identifiable by their names, there are no for-profit firms with fish-
wildlife conservation as its primary business. The summary table is provided in table 6.4. 
On the other hand, cases for the fish-wildlife conservation via tie-in transaction are 
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Federal 
117(12%) 
Unknown 
311 (30%) State 
209(21%) 
Private 
309 (30%) Local Gov. 
70 (7%) 
Figure 6.2. Ownership distribution offish-wildlife conservation dams (1998-99 NID) 
observed. As shown in the NID data, some private resorts own dams for recreational 
purposes with the function of fish and wildlife conservation. For example, in La Plata County 
of Colorado, Warner #5 dam is owned by Advanced Mari<eting Seminars, Inc., a private 
resort designed for training and conference operations, while serving as one of recreational 
facilities within the resort. As another example, Trail Creek dam is owned by Sun Valley 
Company, a famous summer and winter resort in Blaine County of Idaho. While noted as a 
ski resort, Sun Valley in summertime provides for horseback riding, trap and skeet shooting, 
in and outdoor ice skating, swimming, fly fishing, biking, and so on. Fish-wildlife 
conservation of the dam is made possible through the recreational business. 
Some farms or ranches, besides their fanning or raising livestock, also provide 
recreational lodging/camping, fishing, and so on, with the involvement of dams. Spanish 
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Table 6.4. The private owners of dams for fish-wildlife conservation in 1998-99 NID 
State Owner Dam name 
AZ McLellan Lake Properties, Inc. McLellan 
CO Crystal Lakes Water & Sewer Association Lone Pine 
Metroz Park & Lake Co. Metroz Park, Lower 
Lake Maria Grazing Maria 
Red Feather Lakes Storage & Irrigation Co. Mitchell #1; Nakomis Lake 
Advanced Mariteting Seminars, Inc. Warner #5 
Pagosa Lakes Property Owners 
Association 
Linn and Clark; Lake Forest 
Battle Mountain Co. (Ranch) Upper Cogdill 
Cross Bar X Youth Ranch Charies Lemon R R 
Spanish Peaks Ranch Spanish Peaks Ranch #13 
Bessie Goldsworthy Inter-Vivos Trust Cushman 
Colorado Trout Lake Manchester 
Diamond S Ranch Brush Fence Lake; Native Lake 
Otis Company - Lazy 0 Ranch Lazy 0 Reservoir #2 
Black Diamond Mine Ranch Flannery 
Silver Lakes Trout Club Silver Lakes #2 
CT Bristol Fish & Game Bristol Fish & Game 
Remington Arms Company, Inc. Success Lake 
Nomian Thompson (The Thompson Corp.) Lemanquis Dam 
Flanders Nature Center Flanders Wildlife Center 
Northeast Audubon Ford Pond 
Hartford Neighboriiood Services Hihoti Dam 
DE Port Penn Hunting Club Inc Canal Farms Dam 
GA Millhaven Company Baker Pond 
Yellow River Famis Yellow River Farm Pond Dam 
lA K-F Farms K-F Farms 1 
Templeton Farms Inc. Templeton Farms Inc. 
ID Sun Valley Co., Inc. Trail Creek 
IN Bittersweet Moors Community Association Bittersweet Lake Dam 
LA Cypress Black Bayou Lake Commission Cypress Bayou #2 
Calcasieu Marine National Bank Bear Creek #3 
The Howard Corporation Bear Creek #2 
Ragley Lumber Co. do Frank Pruitt Bear Creek #1 
Ajax Realty Company. Inc. Bayou Dupont#17 
MA Audubon Society Wasseka Wildlife Sanctuary 
ME Peabody Pond Association/Acom Assoc. 
Cape Elizabeth 
Peabody Pond 
IP Timberiands Operat. Co., Ltd/Megantic 
Fish & Game 
Massachusetts Bog Dam; Long 
Pond Dam; Little Island Pond Dam 
IP Timberiands Operat. Co., Ltd Spring Lake Outlet Dam 
MS Castlewood Land Development Corporation Dam D 
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Table 6.4. (continued) 
State Owner Dam name 
ND Tuttle Wildlife Club Lake Josephine 
Tumbow Development corporation Tumbow Development corporation 
Wetzstein Bros Wetzstein Bros Ranch Dam 
Basin Electric Glen Harold Mine Coyote 4 
Van Ray Fanms Van Ray Farms Dam 2 
NY Oneida Community Ltd. Oneida Ltd Dam #3 
OK WDW Ranch SCS-WDW Ranch 1 
OR International Paper Gardiner Reservoir 
Gl Ranch Corporation Black Snag Reservoir 
Baker West, Inc. Baker West Nursery Dam 
PA Butler City H&F Club Butler Hunt Club 
B & B Sportsmans Lee Smith Dam 
SC Union Camp Corp. Palmetto Bluff Plant Dam 1 
Mackey Point Plantation Mackey Point Plantation Dam 
Mount Vintage Properties Mount Vintage Dam 
SD May & Sons Inc. May & Sons Dam 
Dakota Hunt Preserve Association Velda Ramser Dam 
Two Bar Two Grazing Association Two Bar Two Grazing Association 
Dam 
TX Montex Drilling Company Lake Mullet Dam; Lake Montex 
Dam; Lake Moncrief Dam 
Conoco, Inc. Conoco Lake #1 Dam 
Lakeview Estates Lakeview Estates Dam 
Wl St. Cloud Mischos 
Mineral Point Hidden Valley Farms 
WY George B. Storer (Old Baldy Club) Lake George 
Haub Bros Enterprises Trust Sunset 
True Ranches, Inc. (Toby Wingert) Hirsig #4 
Federated Mutual Life Insurance (John 
Buxton) 
Alvie #1 
Reeves Inc. (0. W. Reeves) Reeves #1 
High Mountain Ranches Inc. Hillhouse Pond 
Wyo. Game & Fish White Wetlands 
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Peaks Ranch #13 (in Las Animas County of Colorado), for instance, is owned by Spanish 
Peaks Ranch for the purposes of fish-wildlife conservation, recreation, and water supply. 
Similar examples, among others, include Yellow River Farm Pond Dam (in Newton County 
of Georgia) owned by Yellow River Farms, and Black Snag Reservoir (in Crook County of 
Oregon) owned by Gl Ranch Corporation. 
In conclusion, hypothesis 4.a and 4.b are supported by the NID data for (1) the 
absence of for-profit producer ownership with fish-wildlife conservation as the main line of 
business, and (2) the evident presence of for-profit producer ownership with fish-wildlife 
conservation via tie-in transaction in the 1998-99 NID. In other words, this study fails to find 
any evidence for rejecting hypothesis 4 as a whole. 
Hypothesis 5 can be confinmed by the presence of a voluntary individual, proprietor 
with lines of business unrelated to fish-wildlife conservation, or nonprofit organization. As 
shown in 1998-99 NID data, some dams offish-wildlife consen/ation are owned by nonprofit 
organizations. Examples, among others, include Lake Manchester Dam (in Gilpin County of 
Colorado) owned by Colorado Trout Unlimited, Flanders Wildlife Center dam (in Litchfield 
County of Connecticut) owned by Flanders Nature Center, and Wasseka Wildlife Sanctuary 
(in Middlesex County of Massachusetts) owned by National Audobon Society. 
Although there are no owner infomiation other than their names for many privately 
owned dams offish-wildlife conservation in 1998-99 NID, the presence of voluntary 
contributions from individuals and proprietors is suggested by the Partners-for-Fish-and-
Wildlife-Program administered by the federal agency U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. By 
means of this program U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has been offering technical and 
financial assistance to private landowners to voluntarily restore wetlands and other fish and 
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wildlife habitats on their land. Among the private landowners as partners in this program are 
Individuals, proprietors, corporations, private organizations, and educational institutions^  ^
Further confirmation can result from individually investigating those dam owners. 
Take for example the Consolidated Coal Pond #003 in Ward County of North Dakota. This 
pond, at the closed Velva Mine, is a fonmer sedimentation pond now retained as a 
permanent structure to provide a water source for livestock and wildlife. The pond is located 
on tracts of land owned by the Consolidation Coal Company and by an individual. Hence, 
the owner is recorded as "Consolidated Coal Co & priv(ate)" in 1998-99 NID. It is also 
known that an area farmer is now in the process of purchasing both tracts of land under a 
contract for deed. 
As another example, Tumbow Development Corporation dam (in Burieigh County of 
North Dakota) is recorded as owned by Tumbow Development Corporation in the NID. The 
construction of the dam resulted from the wetland mitigation project associated with the 
residential development by the corporation along the Missouri River. The dam serves for 
the conservation of the affected wetlands by the residential development.^  
Similariy, hypothesis 6 is confimned by the presence of the dam ownership held by 
such organizations as landowner/community associations and govemments. As previously 
shown in figure 6.2, there are 396 fish-wildlife conservation dams owned by either the 
federal, state, or local govemments. Moreover, the ownership held by member-owned 
organizations is also evident in 1998-99 NID data. Community or property owners 
associations constitute one of such examples. As shown in the NID, for instance, Lake 
Forest Dam (in Archuleta County of Colorado) is owned by Pagosa Lakes Property Owners 
Association, Bittersweet Lake Dam (in Allen County of Indiana) owned by Bittersweet Moors 
 ^For more information about this program, see the web site http://partners.fws.gov. 
** For the information of the above two examples, I would like to thank Jim Deutsch, director of 
Reclamation Division at North Dakota Public Service Commission. 
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Community Association, and Peabody Pond dam (in Cumberland County of Maine) owned 
by Peabody Pond Association and others. 
Moreover, the NID data shows that many dams for fish and wildlife conservation are 
owned by fishing and/or hunting dubs of close membership. For example, the impounded 
Silver Lakes #2 (in Conejos County of Colorado) is owned by Silver Lakes Trout Club 
exclusively for the use of its members. According to the club manager in the phone 
interview, there are now 35 members, most of which are out-of-state. All members have 
their cottages as private property around the lakes and collectively own the rest of land and 
facilities. If a member decides to terminate the membership, it could sell its cottage to 
someone approved by all other members. The sale price of the cottage will take into 
account all the collectively owned durable assets. Evidently, the inclusion in the 
membership of private cottages circumvents conceivable difficulties resulting from 
othenA/ise. In conclusion, the above evidences support the theoretical possibility maintained 
by hypothesis 6. 
Hypothesis 7 maintains that the presence of a member-owned organization such as 
community or property-owners associations implies the favorable conditions for the member 
homogeneity, but the later does not imply the former. For the identifiable (by name) 
organizations of such kind, a summary table is established as follows. 
Table 6.5. Community associations and its rural/small feature (fish-wildlife conservation) 
State Name of community association Rural/small 
CO Pagosa Lakes Property Owners Association 1 
Lake Maria Grazing Association 1 
IN Bittersweet Moors Community Association 1 
ME Peabody Pond Association/ Acom Assodation Cape Elizabeth 1 
NY Oneida Community Ltd. 1 
SD Two Bar Two Grazing Assodation 1 
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In table 6.5, the first two columns show the identified community associations as the 
owners of dams for fish and wildlife conservation in the 1998-99 NID. and the located states. 
The third column presents the coding of rural or small feature of the associated 
communities, with 1 representing rural/small and 0 othenwise. As shown in the table, all 
identified community or property-owners associations are located in rural or small 
communities. 
For count data, one of the most common tests concerns the parameter 0 of the 
binomial distribution, where 0 denotes the possibility of a success. This test is based on the 
assumption that 0 is the same for each trial, and the trials are all independent. This 
assumption seems appropriate here. First, hypothesis 7 maintains that the high degree of 
the consistency between community associations and their rural/small feature be universal, 
implying a common possibility. Moreover, there Is no obvious reason for believing that one 
association's feature depends on another's. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of no such consistency can be tested against the 
altemative. That is, if there is no such consistency between community associations and 
their mral/small feature, we shall expect similar numbers between rural/small and otherwise 
of those six cases in table 6.5. For the null hypothesis, accordingly, 0 is assumed to be one 
half. All of those 6 identified cases in the NID are rural/small, resulting in the P-value of 
0.0156. It means that the chance is merely 1.56 out of a hundred for obtaining such a 
radical sample when 0 is one half. Such a low P-value makes it difficult to accept the null 
hypothesis. Contrarily, the P-value of 0.0156 suggests that the consistency is highly likely 
between community associations and their rural/small feature, as maintained by the 
hypothesis 7. 
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6.3.3. Dams for flood control 
Logically it will be enough for rejecting hypothesis 8.a and 8.b to show the presence 
of for-profit producer ownership with flood-control service as the main line of business. 
Confinfnation to certain degree of hypothesis 8 will result if there is no conflicting case in 
1998-99 NID data. 
Given the possible classification problem mentioned in section 6.1, the empirical data 
for the flood-control dams is confined to the following three states: Califomia, Illinois, and 
Maine. The corresponding distribution of ownership patterns is shown in figure 6.3. In 
figure 6.3, the ownership held by local governments has a dominating share (about 60%), 
while the governmental ownership in total accounts for about 76%. On the other hand. 
Unknown 
17(4%) 
Federal 
48 (12%) 
State 
r 16 (4%) 
Private 
75 (20%) 
Local Gov. 
229 (60%) 
Figure 6.3. Ownership distribution of flood-control dams (1998-99 NID of 
Califomia, Illinois. Maine) 
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private ownership amounts to about 20% of flood control dams. Finally there are also about 
4% with no specification of ownership type. 
Among those owners with names indicating the associated lines of businesses, there 
is no for-profit firm with flood control as its main business. The summary table is provided in 
table 6.6. On the other hand, tie-in transaction makes possible for-profit producer 
ownership. Tie-in transaction via real estate, as previously discussed, is supported by the 
NID. In the process of land development from site selection and purchase to construction to 
buildings sale/rental, land developers or real estate business companies may become 
involved in the ownership of flood-control dams in their development projects. Evidences 
include flood-control facilities of Orchard Estates (in Orange County nearTusin of California) 
owned by the Irvine Company, Lang Ranch Retention Basin (in Ventura County near 
Thousand Oaks of Califomia), Brookwood Trace Dam (in Will County near Naperville of 
Illinois) owned by Oliver Hoffmann Corporation, and so on. 
Moreover, tie-in transaction via other utilities involving dams is also supported by the 
NID. For example. Last Chance Weir and Peoples Weir (both in Kings County of Califomia) 
are owned by Last Chance Water Ditch Company and Peoples Ditch Company, 
respectively. Last Chance Water Ditch Company engages in the business of water and 
sewage utilities, while Peoples Ditch Company is a ditching contractor. These two dams are 
recorded as for the purposes of flood control and irrigation in the 1998-99 NID. 
On the other hand, there also exist some reporting enrors. Consider the Crawford 
Ranch dam owned by McDowell Valley Vineyards in Mendocino County of Califomia. 
Although recorded as primary for flood control and im'gation, the dam owner maintained the 
purposes of im'gation and frost prevention, while finmly denying the function of flood control 
in the phone interview. Take as another example the Freeman United Industry Pond 20, 
owned by Freeman-United Coal Mining Company in McDonough County of Illinois. The 
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Table 6.6. Private owners of flood-control dams and their business lines 
State Private Dam Owner Business lines 
CA HFH, Ltd. Land development and/or real estate 
management The Irvine Company 
The Lang Ranch Company 
Dove Canyon Company 
KALOKO Land Corporation 
Last Chance Water Ditch Company Water and/or sewage utilities and/or 
ditching contractors Peoples Ditch Company 
Big Valley Mutual Water Co 
Fee Ranch Inc & P H Peterson Fanns or ranches 
Magoon Estate Ltd. 
McDowell Valley Vineyards 
JG Four Ranch 
Northfork Ranch Company 
Fellowship of Friends Religious organizations 
IL Oliver Hoffmann Corporation Land development and/or real estate 
management 
Carol Stream Partners, Inc. Farms or ranches 
Freeman United Coal Mining Company Coal mining 
Glen Manufacturing Company Mechanical manufacturers 
Highland Community College Education institutions 
North Point Property Owners Association Community Associations 
ME Eastern Fine Paper Inc. Pulp and Paper manufacturers 
Lincoln Pulp and Paper Co. 
Echo Lake Association Community Associations 
Forest Lake Association 
Torsey Pond Association 
company maintained in the phone interview that all of their dams were for the purpose of 
sediment control, instead of flood control. 
Hypothesis 9 is confirmed by the presence of the dam ownership held by such 
organizations as community/property-owners associations and governments. The presence 
of government ownership has been shown in figure 6.3. Examples of dam ownership held 
by community assodations in the 1998-99 NID of Califomia, Illinois, and Maine indude as 
follows: North Pointe Lake 0am (in McLean County of Illinois) owned by North Point 
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Property Owners Association, Forest Lake Dam (in Cumberland County of Maine) owned by 
Forest Lake Association, Torsey Pond Dam (in Kennebec County of Maine) owned by 
Torsey Pond Association, and Echo Lake Dam (in Kennebec County of Maine) owned by 
Echo Lake Association. 
Hypothesis 10 maintains that the presence of a member-owned organization such as 
community or property-owners associations implies the favorable conditions for the member 
homogeneity, but the later does not imply the fonner. For the identifiable (by name) 
organizations of such kind, a summary table is established as follows. 
Parallel to the previous table 6.5 in section 6.3.2, the first two columns of table 6.7 
show the identified community associations as the owners of dams for fish and wildlife 
conservation in the 1998-99 NID, and the located states. The third column presents the 
coding of mral or small feature of the associated communities, with 1 representing 
rural/small and 0 othenivise. As shown in the table, all identified community or property-
owners associations are located in rural or small communities. 
Once again, the test concerning the parameter 0 of the binomial distribution is 
applied here. The null hypothesis of no such consistency can be tested against the 
altemative. If there is no such consistency between community associations and their 
rural/small feature, we shall expect similar numbers between rural/small and otherwise of 
those 5 cases in table 6.7. For the null hypothesis, 6 is assumed to be one half. All of those 
Table 6.7. Community associations and its mral/small feature (flood control dams) 
State Name of community assodation Rural/small 
CA Igo-Ono Community Services 1 
IL North Point Property Owners Assodation 1 
ME Echo Lake Association 1 
Forest Lake Assodation 1 
Torsey Pond Association 1 
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five identified cases in the NID are rural/small, resulting in the P-value of 0.0312. It means 
that the chance is 3.12 out of a hundred for obtaining such a uniform outcome when 6 is one 
half. Such a P-value makes it difficult to accept the null hypothesis. Contrarily, the P-value 
of 0.0312 suggests that the consistency is highly likely between community associations and 
their rural/small feature, as maintained by the hypothesis 10. 
6.4. Empirical Conclusions 
The ten hypotheses in the section 6.2 are the direct theoretical implications derived 
from the theory presented in chapter 4 and 5. All hypotheses are supported by the 1998-99 
NID data, as shown in the previous section 6.3. These ten hypotheses lead to some highly 
definite conclusions, especially when we group them into three sets and make comparison 
among the three. 
First of all, in the case of navigational dams/locks, I propose that regulated for-profit 
producer ownership, and government ownership are among the most feasible ownership 
an^angements. The difficulties for the for-profit producer ownership are not in non-
excludability, but in investment specificity and monopolistic power. In theory, regulations 
can eliminate the difficulties and preserve the well-known efficiency associated with profit-
maximizing incentives. However, appropriate regulations do not come from nowhere; they 
relies on certain conditions such as technological, regulatory, and financial advances. When 
favorable conditions are not available, govemment ownership becomes the most dominant, 
if not sole, an'angement for the provision of navigational facilities. Given the scale of 
navigational influence, espedally in the United States, private member-owned organizations 
become less possible Ind/or redundant. Therefore, the organizational distinction from the 
other two cases of dams lies in (1) the possibility of regulated for-profit producer ownership. 
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and (2) the paucity of private customer-owned organizations. However, the theoretical 
possibility of regulated for-profit producer ownership is yet to be confinmed. 
In the case of flood-control dams, non-excludability is the major obstacle against the 
for-profit producer ownership. No wori<able regulation is conceivable without displacing the 
very nature of private contracting. Tie-in transaction becomes the only room for the foothold 
of for-profit producer ownership. Tie-in transaction in this case takes a variety of forms, 
including real estate, other utilities involving dam facilities, and so on. When tie-in 
transaction is not available, the only chance for private ownership is by private member-
owned organizations. The feasibility of such organizations depends on the member 
homogeneity. In other words, if there is serious interest conflict among members, such 
organizations may fail to emerge. Frequently, the larger size of the involved interests, the 
more likely the interest diversity and conflict will result. When conditions are not favorable 
for the above two ownership anrangements, either government ownership or no provision 
will be the likely outcome. 
Finally, dams for fish-wildlife conservation is similar to flood-control dams in that non-
excludability, complicated by the problem of consumer identification, constitutes the major 
obstacle for the for-profit producer ownership. Therefore, tie-in transaction and private 
member-owned organizations are among the ways by which private ownership could take 
place. The most special feature for the ownership offish-wildlife conservation dams lies on 
significantly higher possibility of voluntary contribution by nonprofit individuals and 
organizations. Given the possibility of voluntary contribution, nonprofit organizations 
circumvent the difficulties of non-excludability and collective ownership held by those 
transient and disperse donors, at the price of attenuated effidency owing to lack of profit-
seeking incentives. Ruling out the above three ownership arrangements, either govemnnent 
ownership or no provision will be the likely outcome. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
Since Paul Samuelson raised the profound issue of joint consumption about half a 
century ago, the public good provision has long been one hotly debated subject in 
economics. The definitional generalization by impure public goods makes the concept of 
public goods cover a wide range of goods and services, based on different degrees of non-
rivalry and non-excludability. While many researchers have recognized the establishment 
and enforcement of exclusive rules as the subjects of choice, few pay attention to the 
endogenous nature of non-rivalry characteristic. As discussed in chapter 3, non-rivalry 
characteristic of a public good should not be taken as predetermined by its inherent physical 
nature. For example, when a durable or renewable resource is shared among people, its 
public feature is then created. In the most general sense, all forms of cooperation create 
public benefits and/or costs. Attention should be paid to the reason why people share or 
cooperate, and how. Both are the integral parts of the public good problem. This view shall 
facilitate our analysis in whether and what kind of public goods may be provided. 
Hansmann (1996) is the first to propose a broad organizational classification, based 
on the ownership arrangement, to include most kinds of organizations. In my dissertation, I 
extend his classification to include all kinds of organizations in the system of private 
property. Government is essentially a customer/member-owned organizations, in which 
taxpayers as the customers of governmental services delegate most of their control rights to 
politicians, who in turn delegate part of the authority to the administrative 
bureaucrats/agents. In terms of ownership structure, govemment is not different from other 
private customer-owned organizations such as community associations. To my knowledge, 
this extended organizational perspective is the first that ever classifies all kinds of 
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organizations in a unified theoretical framework, based on the an^angements of property 
rights. 
In the worid of specialization and division of labor, the provision of goods/services 
involves the organizational arrangements of production and exchange. In the process of 
production and exchange, owners of various factors of production and consumers are 
connected within an organization either by way of ownership holding or marketing 
contracting. Different classes of the involved interests (patrons) may have different 
advantages or disadvantages in exercising their property rights as owners, or making 
market contracting. Therefore, different ownership (and thus market contracting) 
arrangements will result in different organizational efficiencies. The above comprehensive 
organizational perspective enables us to examine all the alternatives and make better 
predictions about the organizational patterns. 
Non-excludability is the well-known difficulty featuring public goods. However, non-
excludability is but one possible difficulty in the transacting process between producers and 
consumers for public goods. To study the organizational arangements of public good 
provision, investigation in other transacting difficulties than non-excludability is inevitable. In 
other words, non-excludability as an explanatory factor is not sufficient for analyzing and 
predicting the organizational pattems in a thorough fashion. 
The concept of impure public goods suggests that non-excludability does not always 
constitute the major obstacles. When exclusion is relatively easy, and other transacting 
difficulties are absent, for-profit producer-owned organizations will dominate in most cases, 
arguably owing to the efficiency resulting from the profit-maximizing incentive and owner 
homogeneity. Such a class of owners as investors is highly homogeneous and shares 
among them the clear goal, e.g., maximizing the return of their capital. The advantage of 
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ownership exercising by such a homogenous class of owners is the primary reason for the 
success of investor-owned firms. 
On the other hand, when there exist such transacting problems as investment 
specificity, monopolistic power, informational asymmetry, and so on, the cost of market 
contracting become enomnous between producers and their customers. Those transacting 
difficulties are the obstacles against for-profit producer-owned organizations. Moreover, for-
profit producer-owned organizations are driven by the profitability of their markets. If market 
demands are too limited to guarantee at least the same rate of returns as for investment 
elsewhere, for-profit producer-owned firms will be driven away. 
Customer-owned organizations have evident advantages over producer-owned 
organizations when the above transacting difficulties or lack of profitability prevail. The 
exploitative incentive is largely mitigated under the an'angement of customer ownership 
since the interests of both transacting sides are highly aligned, if not identical, in this way. 
However, customer group as the business owners is in general more diverse and 
heterogeneous, compared with the producer owners such as investors. Therefore, 
customer-owned organizations will be a more efficient organizational altemative only when 
the circumvention of transacting difficulties leads to higher benefit than the increased cost of 
collective ownership exercising among relative diverse owners. On the other hand, in the 
markets lacking profitability, customer-owned organizations might become the only choice, 
since for-profit producer-owned organizations are not available. 
Taking into account the difficulty of collective ownership by diverse owners, another 
scenario is conceivable. When difficulties of both market contracting and ownership 
exercising are prohibitive, nonprofit organizations with absence of patron ownership may 
become relatively efficient. The absence of patron ownership avoids the cost of collective 
decision-making among diverse customers and eliminates the exploitative incentive 
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associated with producer ownership. IHowever. without the above difficulties in market 
transaction and collective ownership, the inefficiency of nonprofit organizations owing to lack 
of profit-seeking incentive will become difficult to justify. Moreover, another disadvantage of 
such organizations is their reliance on the voluntary contributions, which may not always 
provide appropriate financing. 
In theory, some governmental regulations, such as price regulation, mandate 
informational revelation, and so on, may eliminate such transacting difficulties as investment 
specificity, monopolistic power, infomriational asymmetry, and so on. Therefore, once 
established, govemmental regulations might enhance the viability of producer-owned 
organizations. However, such changes could greatly affect some interests long established 
before the presence of regulations. In the example of introducing regulated private toll 
ways, such interests as trucking business and govemmental officials associations were 
observed to be among the strongly opposed. Therefore, establishing govemmental 
regulations may involve intense competition among different interests. Given different 
competitive advantages of different interests under different circumstances, ideal regulations 
may fail to emerge in the political process from time to time. Such failure results essentially 
from the prohibitive cost of settling the interest conflicts in the real worid. 
When non-excludability constitutes the major obstacle in the transacting process, for-
profit producer-owned organizations will find it difficult to secure their profitability. In my 
dissertation, I have identified two possible ways adopted by for-profit producer-owned 
organizations for avoiding the non-excludability. The first is tie-in transactions, by which a 
non-excludable good can be tied with the transaction of other goods free from the non-
excludability difficulty. The other is indirect transaction via a third transacting party, which 
provides a route for circumventing the direct transaction troubled by non-excludability 
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between the two sides. When the above contractual an-angements are feasible, for-profit 
producer-owned organizations may preserve their advantages as previously mentioned. 
When the contractual arrangements of tie-in transactions or indirect transactions via 
a third transacting party are not available, customer-owned organizations may provide the 
resolutions for the non-excludability problem. In the case of common pool resources, such 
organizations as community associations might succeed, depending on the homogeneity of 
the involved interests, in establishing agreed-upon rules for restoring exclusive rights to use 
and income. In the case of fire control, legislation of protecting service provider's income 
right could resolve the non-excludability problem for for-profit fire-control subscription 
business. For-profit producer-owned organizations in this case cannot survive without the 
above legislation, which has to be provided by the govemment, one form of customer-
owned organizations. As in the case of establishing regulations aiming at transacting 
difficulties, if the proposed legislation of protecting providers' income rights greatly affects 
the established interests under other organizational arrangements, interest competition in 
the political process may not result in the legislation. The homogeneity of the involved 
interests again shows its crucial role in this case. 
My empirical study in the ownership pattems of dams strongly supports most of the 
above theoretical conclusions. In the case of navigational dams/locks, investment specificity 
and monopolistic power as the primary transacting difficulties make the govemment 
ownership most likely. 1998-99 NIO data supports this conclusion. Although the possibility 
of for-profit producer ownership with the aid of appropriate regulations is the direct 
theoretical implication, such possibility requires further investigation. In the case of flood-
control dams, against which non-excludability is the major obstacle, for-profit producer 
ownership via tie-in transactions and ownership held by customer-owned organizations such 
as community associations and governments are the most feasible organizational 
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arrangements. In the case of dams for fish and wildlife conservation, nonprofit individuals 
and organizations show its significant presence, besides that of tie-in transactions and 
customer-owned organizations. The above testable hypotheses are some important 
implications derived from my theoretical foundation, which enables me to outline a whole 
picture for the ownership pattems of navigation, flood-control, and fish-wildlife conservation 
dams. Confirming evidences have been found in the empirical study for the theoretical 
foundation maintained in this dissertation. 
Given my intended focus on the most general rules for the organizational pattems of 
public good provision, it is inevitable to neglect many details in those cases discussed in my 
dissertation. Especially, the omission of investigating the historical details of individual 
cases makes it difficult to analyze in depth the dynamic process of organizational 
arrangements. However, it is my belief that only in a dynamic analytical framework will we 
see more clearly how organizational efficiency, interest competition, and organizational 
formation are interrelated. This part will require more focused case studies, which are 
precluded from the research goals that I set for this dissertation. For further refining and 
extending my theoretical analysis, future research in this direction shall be necessary. 
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APPENDIX NID DATA DIRECTORY 
Record 
Assigned by TEC. 
Dam Name 
Official name of the dam. No abbreviations used unless a part of the official name. For dams 
that do not have an official name, the popular name is used. 
Other Dam Names 
Reservoir name or names in common use other than the official name of the dam. Names 
are separated with semi-colons. Leave blank if not applicable. 
Dam Former Name 
Any previous reservoir or dam name(s), if changed. Names are separated with semi-colons. 
State or Federal Agency ID 
Official State or Agency identification number for the dam. 
NID ID 
The official NID identification number for the dam, known fomierly as the National ID. This is 
a required field, and must have an entry for each dam included in the NID. This field is used 
as the unique identifier for each dam record. The first two characters of the identity are the 
state two-letter abbreviation, based on the location of the dam. The last five characters of 
the identity are a unique number (AB#####). 
The NID ID is the Corps Identification Number assigned to each dam in the 1995-96 NID 
update, under the National Dam Inspection Program (P.L. 92-367). Once assigned, this 
number should be not changed. However, the following guidelines are provided for 
assignment of ID numbers for new dams. Each new dam will be assigned an NID ID number 
by the state or federal coordinator. NID ID numbers will not be reused. If a dam is retired or 
is otherwise not longer in existence, that ID number is retired. The state coordinator is 
responsible for assigning ID numbers for all dams, regardless of ownership. The numbers 
may not necessarily be continuous, because of a previously established scheme which 
assigned certain number ranges to federal agendes. Continued use of this numbering 
scheme for new dams is at the discretion of the state coordinator. Please contact ASDSO or 
USACE Dam Safety Team for further information on the process of assigning NID ID 
numbers or if an alternative number sequence is necessary to meet the needs of the state. 
Longitude 
Longitude at dam centerline as a single value in dedmal degrees. 
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Latitude 
Latitude at dam centerline as a single value in decimal degrees. 
Section, Township, Range Location 
Dam location in terms of Section, Township, and Range. Meridian location is included if it is 
needed to locate the dam. (Optional field) 
County 
Name of the county in which the dam is located. 
River or Stream 
Official name of the river or stream on which the dam is built. If the stream is unnamed, it is 
identified as a tributary ("TR") to the named river. If the dam is located offstream, the name 
of the river or stream is entered plus "-OS" or "OFFSTREAM". 
Nearest Cityn* own 
Name of the nearest city, town, or village that is most likely to be affected by floods resulting 
from the failure of the dam. 
Distance to Nearest City/Town 
Distance from the dam to the nearest affected City/TownA/illage, to the nearest mile (and 
tenth if appropriate). 
Owner Name 
Name of the owner of the dam. 
Owner Type 
Code indicating owner type: 
F for Federal: 
S for State; 
L for Local Government; 
U for Public Utility; 
P for Private. 
Dam Designer - New fieid 
Name of the principal firm(s) or agency accomplishing design of dam and major appurtenant 
operating features, and major modifications. The original designer is listed first then 
modification designers (if applicable). The names are separated with semi-colons. 
Private Dam On Federai Property 
Code indicating whether the dam is a private dam located on federal property; 
Y for Yes; 
N for No. 
Dam Type 
Code indicating the type of dam (in order of importance): RE for Earth; 
ERforRockfill; 
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PG for Gravity; 
CB for Buttress; 
VA for Arch; 
MV for Multi-Arch; 
CN for Concrete; 
MS for Masonry; 
ST for Stone; 
TC for Timber Crib; 
OT for Other. 
Codes are concatenated if the dam is a combination of several types. For example, the 
entry CNCB would indicate a concrete buttress dam type. 
Core - New field 
Code indicating the position, type of watertight member and certainty. 
Position: 
F for upstream facing; 
H for homogenous dam; 
I for core; 
X for unlisted/unknown; 
Type: 
A for bituminous concrete; 
C for concrete; 
E for earth; 
M for metal; 
P for plastic; 
X for unlisted/unknown; 
Certainty: 
K for known; 
Z for estimated; 
Foundation - New field 
Code for the material upon which dam Is founded, and certainty. 
Foundation: 
R for rock: 
RS for rock and soil; 
S for soil; 
U for unlisted/unknown. 
Certainty: 
K for known; 
Z for estimated. 
Purposes 
Codes indicating the purposes for which the reservoir is used: 
I for Im'gation; 
H for Hydroelectric; 
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C for Flood Control and Storm Water Management; 
N for Navigation; 
S for Water Supply; 
R for Recreation; 
P for Fire Protection, Stock, Or Small Farm Pond; 
F for Fish and Wildlife Pond; 
D for Debris Control; 
T for Tailings; 
O for Other. 
The order indicates the relative decreasing importance of the purpose. Codes are 
concatenated if the dam has multiple purposes. For example, SCR would indicate the 
primary purposes, Water Supply and Flood Control and Storm Water Management, followed 
by Recreation. 
Year Completed 
Year when the original main dam structure was completed, optionally followed by code ("E") 
to indicate an estimated date. If unknown, and reasonable estimate is unavailable, "0000" 
will be used. 
Year Modified - New field 
Year (four digit) when major modifications or rehabilitation of dam or major control structures 
were completed. Major modifications are defined as a structural, foundation, or mechanical 
constmction activity which significantly restores the project to original condition; changes the 
project's operation; capacity or structural characteristics (e.g. spillway or seismic 
modification); or increases the longevity, stability, or safety of the dam and appurtenant 
structures. Entries should be followed by one of more of the following codes indicating type 
of modification; 
S for structural; 
F for foundation; 
M for mechanical; 
E for seismic; 
H for hydraulic; 
O for other. 
Up to ten modifications can be entered, separated by semicolons. 
Dam Length 
Length of the dam, in feet, which is defined as the length along the top of the dam. This 
length also includes the spillway, powerplant, navigation lock, fish pass, etc., where these 
fonn part of the length of the dam. If detached from the dam, these structures should not be 
included. 
*** Because the "height of dam" definition used by each of the participating State and 
Federal agencies varies, three different height fields are provided in the NID database. Each 
agency is requested to enter values for the height field item(s) that most closely correspond 
to the height of the dam definition(s) used by the agency. Height field items #24-26 that do 
not conrespond to agency data maybe left blank*** 
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Dam Height 
Height of the dam, in feet to the nearest foot, which is defined as the vertical distance 
between the lowest point on the crest of the dam and the lowest point in the original 
streambed. 
Structural Height 
Structural height of the dam, in feet to the nearest foot, which is defined as the vertical 
distance from the lowest point of the excavated foundation to the top of the dam. 
Hydrauiic Height 
Hydraulic height of the dam, in feet to the nearest foot, which is defined as the vertical 
difference between the maximum design water level and the lowest point in the original 
streambed. 
NiD Height 
A calculated field based on the maximum value of field items #25 Dam Height, #26 
Structural Height, and #27 Hydraulic Height, providing a single height value to facilitate 
database queries. 
Maximum Discharge 
Number of cubic feet per second (cu ft/sec) which the spillway is capable of discharging 
when the reservoir is at its maximum designed water surface elevation. 
Maximum Storage 
Maximum storage, in acre-feet, which is defined as the total storage space in a reservoir 
below the maximum attainable water surface elevation, including any surcharge storage. 
Normal Storage 
Normal storage, in acre-feet, which is defined as the total storage space in a reservoir below 
the normal retention level, including dead and inactive storage and excluding any flood 
control or surcharge storage. 
NiD Storage 
A calculated field based on the maximum value of field items #30 Maximum Storage and 
#31 Nomnal storage, providing a single storage value to facilitate database queries. 
Surface Area 
Surface area, in acres, of the impoundment at its nomial retention level. 
Drainage Area 
Drainage area of the dam, in square miles, which is defined as the area that drains to a 
particular point (in this case, the dam) on a river or stream. 
Downstream Hazard Potential 
Code indicating the potential hazard to the downstream area resulting from failure or 
misoperation of the dam or facilities; 
L for Low; 
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S for Significant; 
H for High. 
Definitions, as accepted by the Interagency Committee on Dam Safety, are as follows: 
1. LOW HAZARD POTENTIAL 
Dams assigned the low hazard potential classification are those where failure or 
misoperation results in no probable loss of human life and low economic and/or 
environmental losses. Losses are principally limited to the owner's property. 
2. SIGNIFICANT HAZARD POTENTIAL 
Dams assigned the significant hazard potential classification are those dams 
where failure or misoperation results in no probable loss of human life but can 
cause economic loss, environment damage, disruption of lifeline facilities, or 
impact other concerns. Significant hazard potential classification dams are often 
located in predominantly rural or agricultural areas but could be located in areas 
with population and significant infrastructure. 
3. HIGH HAZARD POTENTIAL 
Dams assigned the high hazard potential classification are those where failure or 
misoperation will probably cause loss of human life. 
Hazard Potential 
Classification 
Loss of Human Life Economic, Environmental, 
Lifeline Losses 
Low None expected Low and generally limited to 
owner 
Significant None expected Yes 
High Probable. One or more 
expected 
Yes (but not necessary for 
this classification) 
Emergency Action Plan 
Code, indicating whether the dam has an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) developed by the 
dam owner. An EAP is defined as a plan of action to be taken to reduce the potential for 
property damage and loss of life in an area affected by a dam failure or large flood. 
Y for Yes; 
N for No; 
NR for Not Required by submitting agency. 
Inspection Date 
Date of the most recent inspection of the dam prior to the transmittal of the data by the 
submitting agency. Date fields require day. month and year infonnnation, and various 
alphanumeric or numeric combinations are used. 
Inspection Frequency - New Field 
Scheduled frequency inten/al for periodic inspections, in years. NOTE; Replacement for 
"Phase I Inspection" field. 
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State Regulated Dam - New Field 
Code indicating whether the dam is "State Regulated" under the National Dam Safety 
Program Act: 
Y for Yes; 
N for No. 
A "State Regulated Dam" is defined as a dam meeting the NID criteria for which the State 
executes one or more of the following general responsibilities: (a) Inspection; (b) 
Enforcement; or (c) Pemiitting. 
State Regulatory Agency 
Name of the primary state agency with regulatory or approval authority over the dam. 
•**NOTE: Following four fields are optional submissions for states"* 
Spillway Types 
Code that describes the type of spillway: 
C for Controlled; 
U for Uncontrolled; 
N for None. 
Spillway Width 
Width of the spillway, to the nearest foot, available for discharge when the reservoir is at its 
maximum designed water surface elevation. 
Outlet Gates - New Field 
Code(s) that describe the type of spillway and controlled outlet gates, if any; 
X for None; 
U for Uncontrolled; 
T for Tainter (radial); 
L for Vertical Lift; 
R for Roller: 
B for Bascule; 
D for Drum; 
N for Needle; 
F for Flap; 
S for Slide (sluice gate); 
V for Valve; 
O for Other controlled. 
Enter up to five types in decreasing size order, separated by semicolons, followed by 
number of gates. 
Volume of Dam 
Total number of cubic yards occupied by the materials used in the dam structure. Portions of 
powerhouse, locks, and spillways are included only if they are an integral part of the dam 
and required for structural stability. 
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"• NOTE: The remaining fields are federal submissions only *** 
Number of Locks 
Number of existing navigation locks for the project. 
Length of Locks 
Length of the primary navigation lock to the nearest foot. 
Lock Width 
Width of the primary navigation lock to the nearest foot. 
NOTE: See Table below for required codes for the following fields*" 
Federal Agency Involvement in Funding 
Code identifying which federal agency was involved in funding of the dam. Codes are 
concatenated if several agencies were involved. 
Federal Agency Involvement in Design 
Code identifying which federal agency was involved in the design of the dam. Codes are 
concatenated if several agencies were involved. 
Federal Agency Involvement in Construction 
Code identifying which federal agency was involved in the construction of the dam. Codes 
are concatenated if several agencies were involved. 
Federal Agency Involvement in Regulatory 
Code identifying which federal agency is involved in the regulation of the dam. Codes are 
concatenated if several agencies are involved. 
Federal Agency Involvement in Inspection 
Code identifying which federal agency is involved in the inspection of the dam. Codes are 
concatenated if several agencies are involved. 
Federal Agency Involvement in Operation 
Code identifying which federal agency is involved in the operation of the dam. Codes are 
concatenated if several agencies are involved. 
Federal Agency Owner 
Code identifying which federal agency partly or wholly owns the dam. Codes are 
concatenated if several owners are involved. 
Federal Agency Involvement in Other 
Code identifying which federal agency is involved in other aspects of the dam. Codes are 
concatenated if several owners are involved. 
132 
Source Agency 
Code identifying the federal or state source agency that has provided the field data on the 
dam. The code used for a state source agency is the two letter abbreviation for the state; the 
code used for a federal source agency is the Federal Agency Code defined in the table 
below. 
State 
The two letter abbreviation for the state in which the dam is located. A calculated field based 
on the field item #6 NIDID. 
FEDERAL AGENCY CODE TABLE 
Federal Agency Name Federal Agency Code 
Department of Agriculture: 
Natural Resources Conservation Serv USDA NRCS 
Formerly Soil Conservation Serv (SCS) 
Forest Service USDA FS 
Rural Housing Service USDA RHS 
Fonnerly Fanners Home Loan 
Department of Defense: 
US Amfiy Corps of Engineers CE 
US Army DOD USA 
US Navy DOD USN 
US Air Force DOD USAF 
Department of Interior: 
Bureau of Indian Affairs DOI BIA 
Bureau of Land Management DOI BLM 
Fish and Wildlife Service DOI FWS 
Geological Survey DOI GS 
Bureau of Reclamation DOI BR 
National Park Service DOI NPS 
Department of Labor: 
Mine Safety and Health Administration DOL MSHA 
Department of State: 
International Boundary and Water Commission IBWC 
Department of Energy: 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission DOE FERC 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission US NRC 
Tennessee Valley Authority TVA 
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